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INTRODUCTION
Complex modern market economies would cease to function
were they not pervaded by commons. These are not commons on
the model of the centuries-old irrigation districts or pastures
that inspired and shaped three decades of the study of the com-
mons, pioneered by Elinor Ostrom., Rather, these are commons
that all modern economies live and breathe on, commons over
which no one exerts exclusionary proprietary claims and that
are available for all to use on symmetric terms. These commons
are the highways and roads that make arteries and capillaries,
the sidewalks and squares that facilitate the flow of commerce
and public life in the world's metropolitan engines. These are
the utilities-electricity, water, and sewage to power, feed, and
cleanse-and the major shipping lanes and container standards
that make trade flow smoothly. These are also math and geome-
try, scientific data, ideas, knowledge, and truths ascertained. So
too is the Internet, from its very core standards to the software
that runs the overwhelming majority of servers, and the rule of
law to govern them all.
None of these is built on a classic model of property rights
and free market exchange between an owner-who centralizes
in a single decision maker all rights to exclude, use, manage,
t Jack N. and Lillian R. Berkman Professor for Entrepreneurial Legal Studies,
Harvard Law School, and Faculty Co-director of the Berkman Center for Internet and
Society, Harvard University. 0 2013, Yochai Benkler.
1 See generally Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institu-
tions for Collective Action (Cambridge 1990).
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and dispose of the object of the property-and all others, an
owner whose exclusive control thereby centralizes the coordina-
tion among all comers and their diverse valuations of the re-
source. Sure, there are private property roads; there are proprie-
tary power generators, pumps, and cesspools or septic tanks.
But these are a sideshow. The main event for all these systems
is open commons: systems that eschew the core of property-the
allocation of asymmetric rights to exclude, use, and manage the
resource set whose use they govern-and instead offer (a) sym-
metric access and use privileges to (b) an open class of potential
users. The price system works when there is asymmetric alloca-
tion-it consists in the use of prices to determine comparative
availability of the resource for competing uses. Symmetric-
access privileges, even when priced, abandon the use of price for
fine-grained allocation, and rely instead on any one of a range of
alternative systems: queuing being the most common, social de-
termination an oft-found alternative.
Brett Frischmann's new book, Infrastructure: The Social
Value of Shared Resources, is the most recent and sustained con-
tribution to the still-small but growing literature seeking to ex-
plore the central role of large-scale open commons in modern
economies. It is an ambitious effort and invites us to think about
four major questions: first, the question of the provision of clas-
sic public goods and a range of quasi-public goods; second, the
question of property versus commons as institutional forms for
managing the production and use of a wide range of resources
and goods that play a critical role in any well-functioning capi-
talist economy; third, the respective roles of market production,
public provisioning, and social production in providing these
critical resources; and fourth, the costs and benefits of general
institutional solutions and analyses as compared to analyses
that are more context specific to spheres of action.
In this, the book is an important contribution to a process of
trying to mesh the longstanding work on the commons in the
Ostrom school with the increasing pervasiveness of commons at
the foundation of the networked information economy:
knowledge and innovation, communications and computation.
Ostrom herself began to explore this convergence over the past
decade,2 in particular as applied to a wide range of new commons
2 See Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity 219-88 (Princeton
2005).
1500 [80:1499
2013] The Essential Role of Open Commons in Market Economies 1501
in sustained collaboration with Charlotte Hess.3 Carol Rose ear-
ly pointed in this direction in Comedy of the Commons.4 But
most of the work on understanding the role of the commons in
contemporary society and economy developed over the course of
the 1990s in a legal literature focused on the networked infor-
mation economy, where "tragedy of the commons" is a funda-
mentally flawed metaphor: studies of the public domain in copy-
right and patent,5 and studies of communications networks and
the then-emerging Internet.6 Frischmann here follows up on his
original expansion of insights from the scholarship on the net-
worked economy to "infrastructure" generally,7 with infrastruc-
ture taking on an extremely expansive definition.8
Frischmann's core claim is that (a) there is a set of resources
whose use creates large positive externalities, particularly
through facilitating downstream production activities of public
and social goods (pp 61-66); (b) these resources are either non-
rival or nonscarce over a sufficient range of their uses and re-
newable over the range of nonscarcity that the costs associated
with implementing a private-property system during the non-
congested periods outweigh the benefits of improved manage-
ment during congestion (pp 61-63);9 and (c) these resources are
often, and should be from an economic perspective (the core pur-
pose of the book is to make the economic argument), subject to
commons management, rather than property, where "commons"
is marked primarily by emphasis on availability to all, of some
3 See generally, for example, Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts,
and Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool Resource, 66 L & Contemp Probs 111
(Winter-Spring 2003); Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom, A Framework for Analysing
the Microbiological Commons, 58 Intl Soc Sci J 335 (2006); Charlotte Hess and Elinor
Ostrom, Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge Commons, in Charlotte Hess and
Elinor Ostrom, eds, Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice 3
(MIT 2007). See also generally Charlotte Hess, Mapping the New Commons (Syracuse
University Working Paper, July 2008), online at http://surface.syr.edulcgilviewcontent
.cgi?article=1028&context-sul (visited Sept 15, 2013).
4 See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U Chi L Rev 711, 778-80 (1986).
5 See notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
6 See notes 66-77.
7 See generally Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and
Commons Management, 89 Minn L Rev 917 (2005).
8 "This book views infrastructure capaciously, emphasizing the functional role of
infrastructure.... [I]nfrastructure resources are shared means to many ends" (p 4).
9 He calls these "partially (non)rival" (p 30), which may be more confusing than
helpful, since they are not in fact nonrival at all, but rather, as the text says, nonscarce
over substantial ranges of their use.
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level of access to the resource, on nondiscriminatory terms
(pp 91-114).
This Review is part review, part observations that reading
the book elicited. Part I outlines the intellectual history of com-
mons studies, and in particular, makes an effort to diagnose the
relations between the more famous Ostrom school of commons
studies-historically focused on the management of natural re-
sources under limited common property regimes (CPRs)-and
the open-commons school that Internet studies and intellectual
property literature in particular developed over the past twenty
years. Part II will outline Frischmann's argument and its con-
tribution to the open-commons school. The contribution is signif-
icant; in particular, Frischmann pushes us to think of the role of
commons well beyond the public domain in intellectual property
or common carriage, open standards, and free and open source
software in communications and Internet systems. I will also
suggest certain ways in which Frischmann's ambition to create a
theory of infrastructure generally, stated almost exclusively in
terms of demand-side market failures, and his effort to yoke
open commons and CPRs together create internal tensions in
the work as a guide to infrastructure policy and as a theory of
commons.
Part III is an effort to clarify and expand an important as-
pect of the argument for open commons that Frischmann sug-
gests in the book. It offers an argument, based on uncertainty
and action in error-prone systems characterized by uncertainty,
for why modern complex economies and societies in particular
depend so heavily on open commons and institutional forms that
eschew exclusive proprietary control over critical resources in
favor of symmetrically defined access and use privileges (p 93).
In a world with persistent uncertainty and positive transac-
tion costs, commons offer the benefits of freedom to operate that
a classical perfect market is supposed to provide in the absence
of transaction costs and with perfect information. The symmet-
ric-use privileges that typify the most important commons-like
highways or electricity, information or the Internet-avoid the
need for transactions at the margin and allow for low-cost explo-
ration in an uncertainty space through experimentation, reas-
sessment, and adaptation to new information. Commons obtain
this high flexibility at the cost of the power to appropriate the
benefits of the new action through control of the resource set
that enabled it, requiring enterprises to seek different leverage
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points and strategies of appropriation. o The elegant institution-
al parsimony of property rights, by contrast, is that, under cer-
tain well-understood conditions, they combine flexibility, infor-
mation gathering, and an appropriation mechanism into a single
institutional entity and can be brought to bear at the point of ac-
tion-the transaction. But under the actual conditions of com-
plex modern economies-which exhibit transaction costs and,
more importantly, are pervaded by uncertainty (not merely risk)
and replete with unknown unknowns-property can often slow
down both owners and potential users.
When we use the words "modern society is complex," we
usually mean at least three analytically distinct things, all cor-
rect: First, we mean that social behaviors at the scales of the in-
terconnected systems we inhabit and rely on, and that structure
our capabilities and susceptibilities, are "complex" in the tech-
nical sense-that is, they display nonlinear emergent properties
and are sensitive to initial conditions and small perturbations.
Second, we mean that they exhibit stochasticity, or a random el-
ement, even where we think that the dynamics we can observe,
such as a set of institutions and behaviors we anticipate in re-
sponse to them, are linear. And third, we mean something not
about the world, but about our tools: that the techniques we pos-
sess require a level of simplification for tractability and that the
information lost in the process of rendering the problem tracta-
ble creates systemic error that is not itself susceptible to solu-
tion within the techniques we possess. The increasing recogni-
tion of the importance of tacit knowledge follows from the third
meaning. A gestalt, "muscle memory" understanding of a situa-
tion and the likely behaviors and approaches to its solution is a
method of practice that can address this problem, not formally,
but practically. The former two meanings of complexity suggest
that unpredictability and uncertainty are simply properties of
the world of social behavior; there is no "solution" to them that
involves perfecting tools to the point of overcoming, at least hy-
pothetically, the last problem. Solutions, behaviors, and practic-
es will necessarily be an imperfect response to their dynamic en-
vironment, and they must necessarily integrate
experimentation, failure, learning, and adaptation alongside
10 See Yochai Benkler, Growth-Oriented Law for the Networked Information Econ-
omy: Emphasizing Freedom to Operate over Power to Appropriate, in Kauffman Task
Force on Law, Innovation, and Growth, Rules for Growth: Promoting Innovation and
Growth through Legal Reform 313, 313-14 (Kauffman 2011).
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planning as a core design element.11 This is pretty standard fare
as an argument for markets over planning bureaucracies. It is
also an argument against the possibility of perfection in mar-
kets. Like markets, commons are necessarily imperfect. What
commons offer is a space for experimentation, learning, and ad-
aptation whose limitations are uncorrelated with the limitations
of the property system. They offer another degree of freedom in
the exploration of solution spaces to the problems that human
existence posits.
Commons offer freedom to operate that allows agents to
identify opportunities for action, resources, and desirable out-
comes, and to act on those opportunities without need for trans-
lating the required resources, actions, and outcomes into a for-
malized set of calls on a resource system--either market or
managerial (state or firm). This freedom to operate can be con-
ceptualized as having an option value marked by the degree of
uncertainty and the value of low-cost experimentation and flexi-
bility to act on locally obtained information (itself sometimes
tacit or difficult to communicate) to deal with that uncertainty;
its cost is the lost appropriation mechanism and losses due to
congestion (where it occurs).
Rapid growth and change-which require rapid innovation,
experimentation, and adaptation, as well as action in an ever-
growing global economy where changes, opportunities, and in-
novations can come from an ever-wider range of actors-depend
on significant levels of freedom to operate: to sense, experiment,
evaluate, and act, and therefore require substantial commons in
resources. That is why so much of the work on the benefits of
commons has come out of the literature on the Internet. Eco-
nomic models geared toward stabilization, rent extraction, and
efficiency in the face of persistent scarcity given a relatively
slow-moving horizon of production capacities can afford to de-
pend more completely on property or managerial competence,
whether in a firm or a state. But the same is not true under con-
ditions of continuous change and uncertainty whose description
resists translation into units susceptible to efficient communica-
tion in markets or hierarchies. The checkerboard of private
property and roads and highways that typifies our metropolitan
areas is a strong visual metaphor for what is true, but invisible,
11 See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am Econ Rev 519, 530
(1945).
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in our institutional landscape as well: the checkerboard of prop-
erty and commons in the complex modern economy as a whole
balances security in holdings with freedom of action.
There is a tension between the two major lines of commons
literature. Growth-oriented commons necessarily occur at scales
incompatible with the congestion solutions developed in common
property regimes. They are oriented toward optimizing freedom
of diverse and uncoordinated action, rather than coordination
among known, sustainable practices that fit a highly refined un-
derstanding of the local context. The hallmark of the Ostrom
school of commons studies was to highlight the persistent ad-
vantages of local knowledge in a highly complex and variable
natural and human environment.12 Locally developed institu-
tions and practices outperformed formalized state-based sys-
tems: both classical private property and the expert regulatory
state. The study was rich, yet-for all but its last decade or so-
self-consciously limited to smallish-scale units where provision-
ing, management, and disinvestment or congestion avoidance
were all rolled up into a single institutional framework built
around specific local knowledge, institutions, and practices.'a
The empirically grounded insistence on the advantages of
the local as the domain of solutions to collective action problems
puts the lessons of this work in tension with the scale at which
the commons operates in complex modern economies. Highways
cannot be regulated by a limited set of users who are permitted
to share them because their very role is to be open to everyone.
So too with electricity, shipping lanes, and so forth. Provisioning
cannot be roughly shared among all users of the open commons
because its whole purpose is to permit a highly diverse, un-
known, and dynamically changing set of actors to experiment in
reliance on the presence of the resource rather than to engage in
its provision. And yet, without governance, the very freedom to
operate that open commons provide also creates the risk of con-
gestion, pollution, or disinvestment. Certainly, the open com-
mons of the air supported industrial development by giving
freedom to operate and avoiding having to ask permission to
emit pollutants. Certainly, the digital commons permitted wide-
spread innovation in peer-to-peer networks, but the freedom to
12 See Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity at 279-80 (cited in note 2).
13 Compare Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions
for Collective Action 26 (Cambridge 1990), with Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Di-
versity at 219-88 (cited in note 2).
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innovate led to (among other things) piracy sites like Napster,
long preceding efforts to think of how, once music is free, society
sustains a class of professional artists. And so the challenge re-
mains to unify these two very different conceptions of the com-
mons: (1) the conception where commons use small-scale produc-
tion and governance systems that can manage provisioning,
congestion, and disinvestment through highly particular and lo-
cal practices and institutions; and (2) the conception where
commons operate as an integral part of open, global, complex
modern economies, and for which neither property nor regula-
tion seems perfectly apt but, because of its necessary scale, can-
not simply cut and paste the traditional Ostrom school commons
approaches either.
Part IV will offer an initial synthesis of the Ostrom school's
insights into collective governance and context-specific institu-
tional analysis and the open commons given the persistent im-
perfection of all the systems we occupy-be they hierarchical
governments or firms, or distributed actors in markets or social
interactions. It embraces an approach that Frischmann's
work with Katherine Strandburg and Michael Madison has
championed.14
I. A BRIEF INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF TWO THEORIES OF THE
COMMONS
The first and most famous line of work on the commons is
anchored in Elinor Ostrom's 1990 book, Governing the Com-
mons.15 That book marked a turning point in the legitimacy of
talking about the commons on the background of a dominant ne-
oclassical understanding of property and the "tragedy of the
commons."16 The second line began with Carol Rose's Comedy of
the Commons17 in 1986, but was most extensively developed in
work on the Internet and the role of the public domain in the
production of knowledge, information, culture, and innovation.
14 See Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann, and Katherine J. Strandburg,
Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 Cornell L Rev 657, 675-83
(2010); Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann, and Katherine J. Strandburg, The
University as Constructed Cultural Commons, 30 Wash U J L & Pol 365, 387-400 (2009).
15 Ostrom, Governing the Commons (cited in note 13).
16 For the seminal work on the tragedy of the commons, see Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
17 Rose, 53 U Chi L Rev 711 (cited in note 4).
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A. The Ostrom School: Collective Action and Common Property
Regimes
Ostrom's work came out of her collaboration with her hus-
band, Vincent Ostrom, in the Workshop in Political Theory and
Policy Analysis at Indiana University; this work was fundamen-
tally a branch of public choice, part of the conversation on the
logic of collective action.5 Its primary focus was on how groups
can solve the problems of collective action without relying on the
state for either of the two then-dominant models: directly regu-
lating behavior or defining and enforcing private property
rights.19 The work emphasized detailed studies of a carefully de-
lineated set of institutions-limited CPRs-applicable to a very
carefully defined class of physical resources, common-pool re-
sources. Using highly context-specific, detail-rich case studies of
these settings, under the Institutional Analysis and Develop-
ment (IAD) framework she developed,20 and abstracting from
them to the mainstream game theory and public choice theory,
Ostrom was able to carve out a distinct and robust field that had
enormous real-world implications for development policy and
that played a critical role as a major intellectual critique of the
dominant model that privileged property rights as the core solu-
tion to collective action problems. CPRs range from the lobster
gangs of Maine,21 through Spanish irrigation districts,22 to Japa-
nese fisheries.23
Until the mid-1990s, "the bulk of commons research [was]
aimed at natural-resource commons, particularly forests and
land, fisheries, and water resources."24 Charlotte Hess, who con-
ducted the most extensive reviews of diverse scholarly work on
commons, and who collaborated extensively with Ostrom in try-
ing to mesh the pre-mid-1990s Ostrom school with the "new
commons" or "knowledge commons" work, showed that this
18 See, for example, Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and
the Theory of Groups 1-3 (Harvard 1971).
19 See Hardin, 162 Science at 1247 (cited in note 16). See also Olson, The Logic of
Collective Action at 101 (cited in note 18).
20 See Elinor Ostrom, Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development
Framework, 39 Pol Stud J 7, 9-11 (2011).
21 See Edella Schlager and Elinor Ostrom, Property-Rights Regimes and Natural
Resources: A Conceptual Analysis, 68 Land Econ 249, 257-59 (1992).
22 See Ostrom, Governing the Commons at 69-82 (cited in note 13).
23 See Arif Satria, Yoshiaki Matsuda, and Masaaki Sano, Contractual Solution to
the Tragedy of Property Right in Coastal Fisheries, 30 Marine Pol 226, 233-34 (2006).
24 Hess and Ostrom, Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge Commons at 6
(cited in note 3).
The University of Chicago Law Review
emphasis characterized the overwhelming majority of studies of
the nontragic commons in that earlier period.25 In that context,
the hallmark of the IAD/CPR line of work was a focus on non-
state-based, mostly local, institutional designs for sustainable
governance of resources limited to a defined set of claimants:
farmers who are part of an irrigation district, harvest a local
forest, or share a pasture or fishery to which they all lay claim in
common vis-a-vis the rest of the world. These institutional de-
signs were CPRs-property regimes applied to resources that
require larger-scale utilization than would be efficient in small,
individually owned parcels, but whose subtractibility character-
istics were such that they could not be open to the world at
large.
The defining feature of this work was the absence of a state-
created property system, not the absence of proprietary claims of
exclusion, use, and disposition, either limiting use to the group
or among group members. Nowhere is this more clearly seen
than in the fact that the irrigation system of Alicante in Spain is
one core instance that Ostrom describes in Governing the Com-
mons.26 There, farmers have a highly fluid, divisible, and trada-
ble set of claims embodied in scrip-denoted entitlements to
minutes of water flow, and engage in an active market for the
exchange of this scrip. If Alicante is a "commons," then what
makes it a "commons" must be an absence of a state-created
property system, not the absence of well-defined, enforced, di-
visible, private property rights. The primary policy implication
of this line of work therefore was that in the management of re-
sources, introducing a government management policy intended
to rationalize use of a system, either by direct regulation or by
parceling out the property to more classically defined property
rights, will undermine a well-functioning, collectively created
system better tailored to local conditions than either standard-
ized institutional framework (property or regulation).27 Ostrom
and the scholarly work that followed her suggest that both
knowledge and motivation are local and sticky, and that ab-
stract, general systems like administrative regulation at the
level of the state- or property-based markets will tend to lose in-
formation and undermine motivation.
25 See Hess, Mapping the New Commons at *20-28 (cited in note 3).
26 Ostrom, Governing the Commons at 78-82 (cited in note 13).
27 See Hess and Ostrom, 66 L & Contemp Probs at 123 (cited in note 3).
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To repeat, there are at least two critical insights here. The
first is that people can in fact come together and solve collective
action problems in sustainable ways, without state law, either
regulatory or property/contract. The second is that individual
private property regimes enforceable by general courts of law,
just like administrative regulation, require a degree of abstrac-
tion from local conditions, and that this abstraction can lead to
substantial knowledge and motivational loss, which, in turn,
may lead to lower performance for the resource system governed
by either one of these more "rationalized" forms. While Alicante
is the most extreme version within these systems, many of the
systems embody various levels of freedom for individual mem-
bers to manage extraction and use within the collectively held
resource system, lacking primarily the right to alienate their set
of privileges to someone outside the system or to make uses out-
side the bounds of the set practices.
But CPRs are decidedly not highways or the Internet proto-
col, which anyone can use under symmetric terms. CPR studies
insist on "the difference between property regimes that are open-
access, where no one has the legal right to exclude anyone from
using a resource, and common property, where members of a
clearly defined group have a bundle of legal rights including the
right to exclude nonmembers from using that resource."28 In oth-
er words, some of the core elements generally identified by the
Ostrom school as necessary to successfully managed commons
fundamentally conflict with the core institutional characteristics
of many of the most critical commons in complex modern econo-
mies. To overcome this gap, in her most recent work, Ostrom,
collaborating with Hess, sought to abstract from the original
constraints.29 For what Hess and Ostrom were now describing as
"knowledge commons," the most useful insight from the Ostrom
school work was the IAD methodological framework: the empha-
sis on a context-specific, recursive, empirically grounded ap-
proach that led her to the original insights, but applied to very
different contexts that may, in turn, yield very different models
of governance. I return to this call, and to its most direct appli-
cation in efforts by Frischmann, Strandburg, and Madison, in
Part IV. -
28 Id at 121.
29 See Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, Private and Common Property Rights, in
Boudewijn Bouckaert, ed, 5 Property Law and Economics 53, 56-57 (Edward Elgar 2d ed
2010).
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But it is important to separate out work within the Ostrom
school (and work that seeks to apply Ostrom's methods with nu-
ance) from the more troubling phenomenon of mechanical appli-
cation. The well-earned legitimacy and prominence of Lin
Ostrom personally, and the CPR literature more generally, has
led her theories to be misapplied where they do not fit. For ex-
ample, a recent analysis of unlicensed spectrum management by
highly prominent economists states that "[t]he Nobel laureate
Elinor Ostrom has written extensively on the diversity of gov-
ernance systems for managing common pool resources.... As
the Wi-Fi example suggests, the regulation of unlicensed spec-
trum can be viewed as a successful example of a managed com-
mons approach."30 This is sheer bunk. WiFi, and all industrial,
scientific, and medical (ISM) radio bands, are open-access com-
mons par excellence. Anyone can build any device they wish that
emits radiation in these bands, deploy it wherever they wish,
and use it for whatever purpose they wish, subject to generally
applicable, symmetric power limits. Despite repeated and vocif-
erous protestation from economists who said that congestion and
a tragedy of the commons would necessarily follow,31 WiFi and
other standards that rely on the open access ISM bands now
serve 70 percent of the smart grid communications market in
North America, 80 percent of its wireless health care market,32
all toll collection systems, 33 and all currently operating mobile
payment systems.34 These are but a few of many instances where
open-access-spectrum commons, no different in its fundamental
institutional structure from the open highway system, has come
to dominate markets that require large amounts of wireless ca-
pacity and needed substantial rapid innovation to serve that ca-
pacity. But to understand why that is so, one needs an entirely
different theory of the commons.
30 Paul Milgrom, Jonathan Levin, and Assaf Eilat, The Case for Unlicensed Spec-
trum *14 (working paper, Oct 23, 2011), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1948257 (vis-
ited Sept 15, 2013).
31 See, for example, Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Band-
width Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big
Joke'" An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 Harv J L & Tech 335, 491 (2001).
32 See Yochai Benkler, Open Wireless vs. Licensed Spectrum: Evidence from Market
Adoption, 26 Harv J L & Tech 69, 72 (2012).
33 Id at 120.
34 Id at 72.
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B. Productive Open Commons in Dynamic Society: From the
Open Road to Networked Society
That "other theory"35 of the commons was initially driven by
legal scholars, rather than political scientists or economists, be-
cause its core focuses on the detailed characteristics of the insti-
tutional design of critical systems in emerging modern econo-
mies. In particular, it sought to understand instances where,
instead of asymmetric exclusion and management rights based
in property, we see extensive use of symmetric access and use
privileges based in commons and the public domain.
1. Highways, waterways, and trade.
The productive commons was introduced in contemporary
legal debates with Carol Rose's notion of "inherently public
property."36 Rose was trying to untangle the then-recent emer-
gence of the "public trust" doctrine, which flew in the face of the
increasingly dominant neoclassical economics bent in legal liter-
ature at the time.37 Rose located the public trust doctrine in a
broader line of cases that went in exactly the opposite direction
to what then-prevalent theories predicted. Instead of defining
and refining property rights in response to increased value of
the resource, these cases redefined property rights in those re-
sources so as to reduce private power to exclude from those re-
sources and increase public access, creating use rights for a gen-
eral, undifferentiated public. Relying on historical analysis, Rose
showed that the public trust cases were part of a line of
longstanding doctrines in property law, most prominently con-
cerning roadways and navigable waterways. She wrote, "The
more radical feature of these cases is precisely their seeming de-
fiance of classical economic thinking and the common law doc-
trines so markedly mirroring that theory: they show a prefer-
ence for public access, superior to the right to exclude that is the
supposed hallmark of private property."38 Public-goods analysis
alone did not explain the open-access model, because for public
goods, "[c]onventional wisdom instructs that in such cases, the
most productive solution would be for government to assume
some or all of the rights of ownership and control over the property,
35 See note 17.
36 See Rose, 53 U Chi L Rev at 720 (cited in note 4).
37 See id at 739
38 Id at 716.
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and to use its powers to correct the market's misallocation."89 As
she sums it up:
[I]n the conventional lore, markets are based on private
rights or, when markets fail, property may be governmen-
tally managed in the interests of aggregate efficiency. Yet
these two options do not logically exhaust all the possible
solutions. Neither can they adequately describe all that one
finds in the recorded history of property in the Anglo-
American universe. In particular, there lies outside purely
private property and government-controlled "public proper-
ty" a distinct class of "inherently public property" which is
fully controlled by neither government nor private agents.40
Here, "inherent" meant that common law doctrine created rights
in roads, waterways, or public squares for the unorganized pub-
lic, rather than a particular subset of users or government as
proprietor.4' Roads and navigable waterways are definitely not
CPRs. Indeed, Rose showed that the doctrines of prescription for
roads, for example, explicitly excluded cases where specific
known individuals, however many, were permitted to cross a
road: "[B]efore property could be claimed as 'public,' its users
had to comprise an indefinite and open-ended class of persons:
as one court said, the road had to be open to 'strangers."'42 Navi-
gable waters included a similar requirement of open-class acces-
sibility.43 These open commons are the very foundation of com-
merce. Rose's primary economic explanation of why these
doctrines emerged relied on the very early versions of what we
now call network effects: demand-side economies of scale mean
that a regime that makes it easier for more users to use these
open-access systems increases their value to all.44 But increasing
returns to scale on the demand side seem to tell only part of the
story, and as network economics itself developed and was re-
fined over the late 1980s and 1990s, it seems clear that some
other kinds of externalities are required to explain the large
benefits of open-access commons necessary to outweigh the well-
known costs. That work now shifted to the new world of the
network of networks-the Internet-and the new dominance of
39 Id at 719.
40 Rose, 53 U Chi L Rev at 720 (cited in note 4).
41 See id at 721.
42 Id at 762, citing Rung v Shoneberger, 2 Watts 23, 25-26 (Pa 1833).
43 See Rose, 53 U Chi L Rev at 764-65 (cited in note 4).
44 See id at 768-70.
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innovation and creativity to growth and development, and con-
sequently new copyrights and patents scholarship and the cate-
gory of "intellectual property" (a term whose use primarily dates
back to the mid-1980s).5
2. Open commons in networked society and economy.
Information is strictly nonrival (the marginal cost of produc-
ing an instance once the original information has been produced
is zero) and is both an input and output of its own production
(we use information to make information). A positive price on in-
formation, once produced, therefore leads to underutilization,
and some of that underutilization includes underproduction of
new information.46 For these same reasons, many economists,47
and some legal scholars48 have long recognized that creating
clear property rights in information goods, patents, and copy-
rights can have negative effects both on welfare (because of the
nonrivalry and deadweight losses) and on innovation (because of
the "shoulders of giants" effectg). Moreover, this basic tension
between a right to appropriate and freedom of access for creative
and innovative reuse has been a bedrock of debates over copyright
45 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex L
Rev 1031, 1033-34 (2005). See also Richard M. Stallman, Did You Say ntellectual
Property"? It's a Seductive Mirage (Free Software Foundation), online at
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/not-ipr.html (visited Sept 15, 2013).
46 See generally Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L J 965 (1990) (ex-
amining the role of the public domain in copyright as a tool that augments innovation by
providing material from which others can draw).
47 This has been a standard argument since Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Eco-
nomics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J Polit Econ 297, 302 (1959). For another discus-
sion of the perverse effect on incentives of open rights to information, see Kenneth J. Ar-
row, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in National Bureau
of Economic Research, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social
Factors 609, 616-17 (Princeton 1962).
48 See Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 124-25 (Columbia 1967);
Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photo-
copies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv L Rev 281, 350-51 (1970); David Lange, Rec-
ognizing the Public Domain, 44 L & Contemp Probs 147, 165 (Autumn 1981).
49 William Fisher was slightly ahead of the curve in applying this to a new justifi-
cation of fair use, and in particular the emphasis on transformative use that later be-
came the hallmark of contemporary fair use law. See William W. Fisher III, Reconstruct-
ing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv L Rev 1659, 1702-04, 1746 (1988) (explaining
deadweight loss, but emphasizing an Aristotelian, human-flourishing approach to defin-
ing the normative desirability of balanced copyright, rather than an economic perspec-
tive on specifically open commons).
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and patent for over two hundred years.50 It is therefore unsur-
prising that the public domain in copyright and patent became
the first locus for developing the idea that open commons were a
critical element of modern complex society and economy, a pro-
ject that unfolded mostly over the course of the 1990s and early
2000s.
In 1990, Jessica Litman offered the first overview of the
wide range of doctrines in copyright law that construct this pro-
ductive public domain.1 She wrote, "The public domain should
be understood not as the realm of material that is undeserving
of protection, but as a device that permits the rest of the system
to work by leaving the raw material of authorship available for
authors to use."52 In particular, she began to draw the work on
the public domain into the sphere of work on the commons: "In
the intellectual property context, the term describes a true
commons comprising elements of intellectual property that are
ineligible for private ownership. The contents of the public do-
main may be mined by any member of the public."5 The direct
tie between the public domain and modern economy, in turn,
was most urgently driven by the awkward fit between software
and the traditional categories of copyright and patents and the
centrality of software innovation to the most advanced areas of
modern economies. This tension made amply clear that the ab-
sence of either property rights or well-defined, limited CPRs was
necessary to support the kind of rapid, cumulative, decentralized
innovation that the software industry was experiencing in the
late 1980s and early 1990s.** No scholar explored this tension
and communicated its effects to lawyers and nonlawyers alike
more than Pamela Samuelson.55 Samuelson became the leading
mentor of a generation of copyright scholars working on copy-
right in the digital environment.
50 See James Boyle, The Public Domain* Enclosing the Commons of the Mind 17-41
(Yale 2008); Josh Lerner, 150 Years of Patent Protection, 92 Am Econ Rev 221, 222
(2002).
51 See Litman, 39 Emory L J at 970-77 (cited in note 46).
52 Id at 968.
53 Id at 975, citing, among other sources, Rose, 53 U Chi L Rev 711 (cited in note 4).
54 For an early version of people who develop software understanding the core of
this dynamic, see Simson L. Garfinkel, Richard M. Stallman, and Mitchell Kapor, Why
Patents Are Bad for Software, 8 Issues in Sci & Tech 50, 53 (1991).
55 For merely the two articles directly cited by Garfinkel, Stallman, and Kapor, see
generally Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case against Patent Protection for
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 Emory L J 1025 (1990);
Pamela Samuelson, Should Program Algorithms Be Patented?, 33 Comm ACM 23 (1990).
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By 1993, a multidisciplinary group of scholars had issued
the Bellagio Declaration, explicitly raising the concern that
"[t]he aggressive expansion of intellectual property rights has
the potential to inhibit development and future creation by fenc-
ing off 'the commons,'"@i a set of concerns that one of the declara-
tion's coauthors, James Boyle, went on to explore extensively in
Shamans, Software, and Spleens.67 Some of the participants in
that process were focused on more Ostrom-school concerns, such
as Keith Aoki's work on preserving access of farmers to landrace
seeds in the teeth of "rationalization" through proprietary seed
development,"8 or Rosemary Coombe's research on cultural prop-
erty of indigenous people whose common property was being ex-
tracted by pharmaceutical companies that turned it into private
property.59 But Boyle in particular located the centrality of the
aggressive expansion or fencing in of the commons in an under-
standing of a new moment in economic history. He argued that
understanding the dynamic of intellectual property and the
commons is the equivalent, for understanding the networked so-
ciety, of understanding "the legal and social arrangements of
wage labor and the institutional framework of capital formation"
for "understand[ing] the American economy of the early twenti-
eth century."o Boyle further argued that such understanding is
critical for a coalition of those who have "greater concern for the
public domain [ ] as a resource for future creators and as the raw
material for the marketplace of ideas," including reporters con-
cerned about chilling effects on journalism from The Nation case
(Ford memoirs),61 "the programmers in the League of Program-
ming Freedom" (the precursor to the Free Software Foundation),
rap musicians who wish to sample music, and small software
66 The Bellagio Declaration (Society for Critical Exchange), online at
http://www.cwru.edu/affllace/BellagioDec.html (visited Sept 15, 2013).
67 James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the
Information Society 174-84 (Harvard 1996).
58 See Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the
(Not-So-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 Ind
J Global Legal Stud 11, 52-57 (1998).
59 See Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty:
New Dilemmas in International Law Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge
and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 6 Ind J Global Legal Stud 59, 80-89 (1998).
60 Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens at 13 (cited in note 57).
61 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539 (1985) (holding
that The Nation's unauthorized publication of excerpts from President Gerald Ford's not-
yet-published memoirs was not a fair use).
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companies, among others.62 In other words, Boyle saw the new
understanding of the commons as necessary to define precisely
the coalition that would ultimately come together over the first
decade of the twenty-first century to challenge efforts to expand
intellectual property rights. Contributing to the generalization
of the concept of freedom to operate was the fact that proponents
of strong patent or copyright began to take the "intellectual
property" moniker seriously and make claims about the benefi-
cial effect of "property" institutions in the area of innovation and
creativity.8 Mark Lemley offered an early critique of this
propertization movement based on endemic market failures in
the economics of improvements in information and innovation
and strong positive externalities,64 and Julie Cohen criticized
nascent efforts to apply concepts from physical property to cy-
berspace as fundamentally misplaced.65
Building on the work on the public domain, my own contri-
bution was to expand the claim about the role of commons be-
yond the public domain in intellectual property to a broader set
of resources central to networked society and economy. In work
specifically on spectrum commons66 and intellectual property,67 I
argued that, because of nonrivalry or renewability, commons
were a viable alternative to state or private property for a wide
set of resources that were critical to the information economy;68
the primary effect of the choice between commons and property
was the industrial organization of the system,69 in particular,
that "commons can cause organizations and individuals who use
these resources to organize the way they produce information in
62 Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens at 168 (cited in note 57).
63 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J L &
Econ 265, 267-75 (1977).
64 See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 Tex L Rev 989, 1049-57 (1997).
65 See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
'ights Management", 97 Mich L Rev 462, 466 (1998).
66 See Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Dig-
itally Networked Environment, 11 Harv J L & Tech 287, 359 (1998).
67 See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Con-
straints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 NYU L Rev 354, 424 (1999).
68 Yochai Benkler, The Commons as a Neglected Factor of Information Policy *2
(speech presented at the 26th Annual Telecommunications Research Conference Oct 5,
1998), online at http://www.benkler.org/commons.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
69 See Benkler, 74 NYU L Rev at 400-01 (cited in note 67); Yochai Benkler, Intel-
lectual Property and the Organization of Information Production *42-44 (unpublished
manuscript, Oct 1999), online at http://www.benkler.org/Ipec99.pdf (visited Sept 15,
2013).
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a decentralized pattern."70 Abstracting away from the particular
doctrines or rules through which any given open-access com-
mons was made and rejecting the idea that an absence of rules
was definitional, I argued that "commons" referred to "institu-
tional devices that entail government abstention from designat-
ing anyone as having primary decision-making power over use of
a resource."7' It was not the absence of any use rules that made
a commons, but the absence of asymmetric power to determine
the disposition of a resource. This absence of asymmetric power,
in turn, provided for a more diverse speech environment,72 of-
fered more diverse market innovation in wireless equipment,73
and harnessed the innovation and creativity of radically decen-
tralized actors more generally: "The capacity of thousands to
scour a rich universe of existing information resources allows
them to identify productive opportunities and the creative indi-
viduals who can best use these resources. That capacity is the
primary source of increasing productivity gains that peer pro-
duction offers our economy."74
Lawrence Lessig wrapped up this first decade of work on
the networked economy commons in 2001 by generalizing it to
the Internet as a whole, at its physical, logical, and content lay-
ers, and connecting the commons to the core value of avoiding a
permissions culture.75 In other words, commons at every layer of
the networked environment meant that no one needed permis-
sion to create and express themselves, that no one needed per-
mission to innovate in and with the network, and that as a re-
sult creativity, speech, and innovation all depended on a robust
commons throughout these resources.76
In 2005, Frischmann first began to reconnect the work on
the Internet and public domain to the kinds of physical com-
mons with which Rose had begun the conversation.77 There he
first pursued the approach that he now concludes in Infrastruc-
ture, expanding from Internet and public domain, to roads,
70 Benkler, The Commons as a Neglected Factor at *1 (cited in note 68).
71 Id at *2.
72 See id at *2-3; Benkler, 74 NYU L Rev at 386 (cited in note 67).
73 See Benkler, 11 Harv J L & Tech at 290-92 (cited in note 66).
74 Yochai Benkler, The Battle over the Institutional Ecosystem in the Digital Envi-
ronment, 44 Comm ACM 84, 88 (2001).
75 Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected
World 147-233 (Random House 2001).
76 See id at 161.
77 See Frischmann, 89 Minn L Rev at 923-28 (cited in note 7).
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lakes, and a wider range of infrastructure goods entirely unre-
lated to the networked information economy (p ix). But before I
turn to exploring his argument as it has developed in the new
book, I will spend a few paragraphs distinguishing various other
usages of the "commons" that are parallel, but not quite part of,
either of these two major schools of thought on the commons.
3. Mapping commons studies.
In the fall of 2001, Ostrom first engaged the new legal liter-
ature on commons. In the first of several works she co-authored
on this tension with Charlotte Hess, Hess and Ostrom focused
on Litman's Public Domain,78 Lessig's Code and the Commons,79
and my own The Commons as a Neglected Factor of Information
Production for critique.8o Hess and Ostrom's primary critique of
our work was that we in the legal academy were too focused on
the public domain as the core instance and were unable to an-
swer the question of what is "the commons": "Is it a given right,
a nonassigned right, an unclaimed right, an unmanaged re-
source, or something that should just be there in a democracy?"1
They then proceeded to lay out the analytic framework that
made Governing the Commons and the work on common proper-
ty regimes so successful-an institutionalist method of critiqu-
ing the neoclassical model of property.82 In particular, on the
characteristics of the resource set, Hess and Ostrom emphasized
the centrality of high subtractability to the definition of com-
mon-pool resources and underscored that what these resources
78 The quote they referred to was: "In the intellectual property context, the term
describes a true commons comprising elements of intellectual property that are ineligible
for private ownership. The contents of the public domain may be mined by any member
of the public." Litman, 39 Emory L J at 975 (cited in note 46).
79 Lawrence Lessig, Code and the Commons *2 (speech presented at the conference
on Media Convergence at Fordham University Law School Feb 9, 1999), online at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edulworks/lessigfordham.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013) ("The
commons: There's a part of our world, here and now, that we all get to enjoy without the
permission of any.").
80 Benkler, The Commons as a Neglected Factor at 2 (cited in note 68):
"The commons" refers to institutional devices that entail government absten-
tion from designating anyone as having primary decision-making power over
use of a resource. A commons-based information policy relies on the observa-
tion that some resources that serve as inputs for information production and
exchange have economic or technological characteristics that make them sus-
ceptible to be allocated without requiring that any single organization, regula-
tory agency, or property owner, clear conflicting uses of the resource.
e1 Hess and Ostrom, 66 L & Contemp Probs at 114 (cited in note 3).
82 See id at 118-28.
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shared with public goods was the difficulty of exclusion, not a
nonrival nature.83 On the characteristics of the institutional re-
gime, they emphasized-as Ostrom had in Governing the Com-
mons-the "confusion between open-access and common-
property regimes."84 The combination of these distinct character-
istics of common property regimes led Hess and Ostrom to cau-
tion that
analyzing the whole ecosystem of scholarly information is
much more tenuous than in Governing the Commons ....
Information ... often has complex tangible and intangible
attributes: fuzzy boundaries, a diverse community of users
on local, regional, national, and international levels, and
multiple layers of rule-making institutions.... Distributed
digitized information, such as that on the Internet, adds
more layers of complexity to the flow.... [Dl igital infor-
mation, though subject to congestion, is generally nonsub-
tractive; thus, the resource flow is not subject to erosion (de-
terioration) in that same way that physical information
artifacts are (books, journals, newspapers, etc.).8*
To overcome these difficulties, Hess and Ostrom chose to apply
their familiar framework to the most "well-behaved" problem as-
sociated with information and knowledge: libraries.86 Libraries
are simple for the literature on common-pool resources because
they are hard to characterize as problems of information eco-
nomics. Unlike their knowledge content, copies of books are rival
and excludable. Library stacks, reading rooms, and budgets are
constrained. These problems were the familiar problems of con-
gestible facilities and subtractable (or rival) goods, meant to be
shared by a moderately large and definable set of users, applied
near a domain that raises the real challenges to the traditional
model of property when applied to innovation, knowledge, cul-
ture, and communications. But the basic theoretical challenge
remained: at the very heart of the most advanced economies,
commons of a form that did not fit the increasingly legitimate
version of felicitous commons studies were growing in importance.
Following on this initial assessment, the most comprehen-
sive and thoughtful map of this terrain was Charlotte Hess's
83 See id at 120.
8 Id at 122.
88 Hess and Ostrom, 66 L & Contemp Probs at 132-34 (cited in note 3).
86 Id at 134-39.
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Mapping the New Commons.87 Covering over 450 references
mostly published between 2000 and 2007, Hess surveyed the lit-
erature on commons outside what she calls "traditional com-
mons,"8 or what I have here described as the Ostrom school.
Mostly, the new commons Hess described included knowledge
and Internet commons as well as infrastructure, which primari-
ly meant, in that review, spectrum commons and core Internet
standards and protocols.89 Furthermore, specific work on, for ex-
ample, open-access scientific publications, access to medical in-
novation and biomedical materials, or cultural commons feature
as distinct elements, but these largely fall within a similar con-
cern with enclosure and control, and many share the economic
characteristics underscored by the 1990s work on the public do-
main and the Internet. The primary third school of commons
studies one might identify from Hess's review, in addition to the
Ostrom school and the open-commons school, is the use of com-
mons to identify a set of problems around the ideas of shared
fate and publicly owned resources as a critique of capitalism.
Here commons refers to a sense that we are at risk globally of
destroying the planet based on a tragedy of the commons, and
the work thus evokes both the tragic sense of the commons and
a pastoral image of the commons as shared heritage, using it as
normative leverage to claim against overdevelopment or break-
down of human social and ecological systems in the face of the
logic of growth. David Bollier's work has been central in bridging
between this literature and the two other schools.90 I will not ex-
plore this third school here, although Frischmann's book does
seek to incorporate that aspect of commons literature by treat-
ing lakes and the environment as "infrastructure" alongside
roads, electricity systems, and human knowledge (p 227). Ad-
dressing that aspect of the commons literature is beyond the
scope of this Review, however. It is challenge enough to crystal-
lize the distinction between open commons and the Ostrom
school, and to outline the possibility of constructive dialogue be-
tween these two schools without expanding further.
87 Hess, Mapping the New Commons at *13 (cited in note 3).
88 Id at *2.
89 Id at *18-19.
90 See generally, for example, David Bollier, Silent Theft: The Private Plunder of
Our Common Wealth (Taylor & Francis 2003); David Bollier, Public Assets, Private Prof-
its: Reclaiming the American Commons in an Age of Market Enclosure (New America
Foundation 2001), online at http://www.newamerica.net/files/nafmigration/archive/Pub
File_650_1.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
1520 [80:1499
2013] The Essential Role of Open Commons in Market Economies 1521
Finally, within the legal literature there are two terms that
incorporate the word "commons" and have become widely used,
and these need to be distinguished here from the open-commons
school. First, Michael Heller's "anticommons" concept refers to a
situation of extreme Coasean inefficiency.9e Ronald Coase ex-
plained that, given transaction costs, markets will fail to move
entitlements to their best use; markets move entitlements only
to uses whose marginally higher value exceeds present uses by
more than the transaction costs associated with shifting to the
higher-valued use.92 That is why it is important for judges to as-
sign rights to their best use or to lower transaction costs: they
cannot rely on markets to effect transfers given transaction
costs. Heller, observing the bizarre construction of rights in the
post-Soviet economies, identified a state in which property
rights in critical dependencies lead to stasis.98 Given sufficient
mismatch between the shape of entitlements and the usable
packets of resources, and sufficient transaction costs for the re-
composition of resources into usable packets, resources will go
unused, as opposed to merely inefficiently used.94 This then be-
came an excellent model by Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg for
identifying the problems with patenting of small-scale research
tools and gene sequences,95 and what others, following Carl
Shapiro, called "patent thickets."96
It is critical to understand that, as a matter of legal theory
and institutional design, the implication of identifying anticom-
mons problems is not necessarily the introduction of commons or
a common property regime (although it might be). The first and
most direct implication is the need to understand the scope and
definition of usable units of the resource in question. Then, one
may need either to redefine the property rights in question to fit
usable units of the covered resource or to define a commons in
the resource, depending on whether it is the type of resource
that is best governed by commons or property. But if the answer
91 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transi-
tion from Marx to Markets, 111 Harv L Rev 621, 624 (1998).
92 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 15-16 (1960).
93 Heller, 111 Harv L Rev at 621 (cited in note 91).
94 Id.
95 See Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698, 699-700 (1998).
96 See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools,
and Standard Setting, in Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner, and Scott Stern, eds, 1 Innovation
Policy and the Economy 119, 120 (MIT 2001).
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to a perceived anticommons problem is not obtainable by a re-
definition of private property rights around the resource in ques-
tion, but rather requires instantiation of a commons, like a
highway, then the core problem for the resource is not an anti-
commons problem at all: it is one of misapplying property where
commons are the appropriate institutional form. In other words,
"anticommons" rather than "lack of commons" is the best de-
scription of the diagnosis only if "better-defined property rights,"
as opposed to a "better-designed commons," is the primary
treatment.
The second important use of the term "commons" is Henry
Smith's "semicommons."97 Semicommons, backed out of Smith's
study of the open-fields system in England,98 refers to a situation
where the same exact resource is used best for production at dif-
ferent scales.** In the case of fields, wheat growing, which was
done on private allocations within the open fields, was a small-
scale event, while animal grazing was a large-scale event with
costs (trampling) and benefits (manure) for wheat growing. A
well-functioning semicommons divided the individual tracts
such that small-scale production problems were appropriated ef-
ficiently, while free riding or defecting in the common uses was
hard.100 Several papers have tried to analyze policy problems di-
rectly applicable to the Internet by comparison to semicommons:
telecommunications regulation,101 information production and
intellectual property, 102 or the Internet more generally.103 Of
these, the application to intellectual property seems most apt. In
particular, it helps explain that debates over the proper scope of
intellectual property are never between property and commons,
but rather are debates over delineating the boundaries (a) with-
in a semicommons between the private and common aspects (for
example, debates over term of coverage, or the definition of fair
use), and (b) between where there is a semicommons and where
97 See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open
1ields, 29 J Legal Stud 131, 131-32 (2000).
98 See id at 134-38.
99 See id at 131-32.
100 See id at 149-51.
101 See Henry E. Smith, Governing the Tele-semicommons, 22 Yale J Reg 289, 293
(2005).
102 See Robert A. Heverly, The Information Semicommons, 18 Berkeley Tech L J
1127, 1127 (2003); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Enti-
tlements in Information, 116 Yale L J 1742, 1794 (2007).
103 See James Grimmelmann, The Internet Is a Semicommons, 78 Fordham L Rev
2799, 2799-2800 (2010).
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there is commons simpliciter (for example, rights in data, status
of government publications, and future status of academic pub-
lishing straddle the two types of debate).
Given that information goods are nonrival, the exclusion of
pure property-like systems is unsurprising. Even the efforts of
Hollywood and the recording industry to create an effectively
perpetual copyrighto4 are an instance of debate about where the
boundary within a semicommons is located: none of the industry
lobbyists are suggesting that scnes-a-faire doctrine be changed
to force them to pay owners of standard plot lines a royalty;
none are suggesting that Shakespeare's or Dickens's heirs be lo-
cated so as to facilitate a market in clearances of rights to make
new versions. Finally, the application of semicommons to the In-
ternet generally, based on the private ownership of computers
and physical connections to an open network, seems to suffer
from the same mistake as treating highways as semicommons
because they are used in private cars. TCP/IP is at its very core
a protocol for symmetric, best-efforts clearance of calls on the re-
sources of the network, free of any calls on the state to prioritize
one person's preferences for clearance over the network over an-
other's.O5 It epitomizes a commons. HTML and the Web similar-
ly do so. Indeed, recent efforts by such bastions of socialism as
the Financial Times to develop an HTML5-based version for the
iPhone and remove apps from the App Store are precisely an in-
stance of organizations leveraging the commons aspect of HTML
to get out from a property system applied in a platform context
that gave Apple the leverage to demand 30 percent of every app-
based transaction.106
II. THE ARGUMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE
Frischmann approaches the expansion of the scope of com-
mons-based management systems from the perspective of de-
mand-side market failures in a broadly defined class of re-
sources that he defines as "infrastructure" (p 61). He explicitly
eschews the vulgar "if infrastructure, then commons" argument
(p 60), but he does argue that, for resources that fall into the
104 See, for example, Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub L No 105-298,
112 Stat 2827 (1998), codified in various sections of Title 17.
105 See Benkler, 11 Harv J L & Tech at 334 n 207 (cited in note 66).
106 See FT Pulls App over Customer Data Dispute with Apple, BBC News (BBC Aug
31, 2011), online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-14734911 (visited Sept 15,
2013).
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definition of infrastructure, commons of various forms often pro-
vide a useful institutional solution space to the range of de-
mand-side problems that these resources present for classic
property-based, private provisioning (p 93).
In Frischmann's approach, resources are "infrastructural" if
they satisfy three characteristics:
(1) They are resources that "may be consumed nonrivalrous-
ly for some appreciable range of demand" (p 61);107
(2) They are resources whose demand is primarily as input
into downstream productive activities or capital goods
(p 61); and
(3) They are used as input into a wide range of goods and
services, including, importantly, downstream public goods
and "social" goods-by which he means a range of nonmar-
ket goods, like ecosystems or rule of law; merit goods (things
a society's normative commitments require that everyone
have); social capital; and Charles Taylor's "irreducibly social
goods"108 (p 61).
Frischmann is explicit that these three characteristics are cu-
mulative and that what he calls "infrastructure goods" are solely
those that are characterized by all three (p 66). The first, he ar-
gues, assures that the insights are limited to resources where
the costs of not installing a private property system are relative-
ly low (p 66). The second and third "give rise to an assortment of
demand-side market failures associated with externalities, high
transaction and information costs, and path dependency" (p 66).
About half the book is then dedicated to working out the particu-
lar market failures associated with these characteristics, in par-
ticular the ways in which aggregate private demand for
these goods will fail to express the full social value of these
infrastructural resources, and hence markets will fail to pro-
vision them adequately.
107 What he means by this is actually broader than nonrivalry. He includes re-
sources that are nonscarce over a substantial range of their demand, are congestible over
some ranges, are susceptible to clearance by nonproperty models during the period of
congestion, and are renewable within a period sufficiently compact to retain both their
nonscarce condition and their shareable nature during congestion over the long term,
like roads. He calls these "partially (non)rival," an aesthetically odd construct, but one
that does not affect the analytic content.
108 See Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments 127-45 (Harvard 1995).
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A critical element of the argument is that, in these re-
sources, positive externalities are widespread, and mechanisms
of internalization are likely to be costly and imperfect (pp 39-
41). From Frischmann's perspective, this phenomenon is limited
to instances where public and social goods are a significant part
of the downstream products using infrastructure inputs, because
those are particularly vulnerable to a poor fit between the ag-
gregate welfare they produce and the privately expressed de-
mand for the infrastructure (pp 48-56). By contrast, a road that
only leads to a small number of privately owned factories, all of
which can calculate and express their private value of access to
the road, is not an "infrastructure resource" as he defines it
(pp 48-49). While an input into downstream production, and
partaking of the demand variability characteristic that Frisch-
mann calls "partial (non)rivalry," (pp 30-32) the downstream
users have no difficulty expressing their private welfare through
payments to a road owner, and there are no meaningful failures
associated with internalization.
A second major element is that "infrastructure" is clearly
not limited to public and social infrastructure, but includes
commercial infrastructure as well. Core examples Frischmann
identifies are basic manufacturing processes, like milling or the
assembly line, basic agricultural and food production processes,
such as irrigation technology or canning, roads, the electric grid,
telecommunications networks, and so forth (p 67). However, alt-
hough these are "infrastructure" based on his definition, he
claims that these are not usually candidates for "commons man-
agement" on the basis of their function as commercial infra-
structure. Instead, Frischmann claims that "[flor pure commer-
cial infrastructure, competitive output markets should work well
and effectively create demand information for the input, and
market actors (input suppliers) will process this information and
satisfy demand efficiently" (p 68). I will take up this argument
in Part III. Suffice it to say that Frischmann himself doesn't re-
ally hold a broad version of this basic statement, because he
immediately explains that research, even applied commercial
research and certainly basic commercial research, has strong
positive externalities that cannot, and should not, be internal-
ized (p 78 figure 4.4).
Because of his baseline commitment to focusing on demand-
side failures and his claim that commercial infrastructure does
not present particular demand expression problems, Frischmann
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emphasizes the critical role of public and social goods that de-
pend on infrastructure in justifying the use of commons. Where
infrastructure is a necessary input to public and social goods,
the demand for these goods, which is not fully expressed in mar-
kets, if at all, will not generate sufficient sales whose value can
adequately represent demand for the infrastructure inputs
(p 74).
The most important element in the argument, to which I re-
turn in Part III, is uncertainty and flexibility. Following a be-
havioral framing, Frischmann discusses these as "biases"
(pp 82-86), applied to organizations, to wit, infrastructure pro-
viders, who will seek more appropriable gains (as opposed to ig-
noring externalities-rich applications), "sure bet" optimization,
and bias toward optimization to existing applications or down-
stream uses, rather than to open innovation on the infrastruc-
ture. I am not at all convinced that cognitive "bias" is the right
way to think about organizational (as opposed to individual) de-
cision making at all, or about these particular kinds of failures,
or is even necessary to describe the actions of organizations
seeking increased returns to investment, rents, or reduced vari-
ance in returns. Whether or not one uses a behavioral frame-
work to make these points, the role of late-binding design, or
flexibility of infrastructure to a range of unknown uses, has been
central to the analysis of commons in communications and the
public domainl09 and is absolutely central to understanding the
ubiquity of commons in modern complex economies.
The final piece of the puzzle is Frischmann's argument that
infrastructure is often best managed as an open-access commons
subject to certain use rules, or at least on the model of an open
class of users. Critical to the definition of commons management
as he uses it is that the resource is open on "nondiscriminatory
terms ... that do not depend on the users' identity or intended
use" (p 92). This does not necessarily require government regu-
lation. Consistent with his view of commercial infrastructure,
his focus for government action is on public and social infra-
structure. As far as regulating commercial infrastructure, he
concludes that "the case for imposing commons on privately-
owned commercial infrastructure is limited to well-understood
rationales reflected in antitrust and regulatory economic tradi-
109 The best crystallization of the argument is Lessig, The Fhture of Ideas at 88-S9
(cited in note 75).
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tions" (p 107). In particular, he emphasizes essential facilities
concerns on the antitrust side, and natural monopoly and social
policy constraints on the regulatory side (pp 106-07). He puts
the weight of his argument for regulatory choices behind public,
social, and mixed infrastructures (those that are an input to
both commercial and public or social uses). His strong emphasis
here is that firms have no particular advantage in measuring or
predicting social value, so that for "public, social, and mixed in-
frastructure, the case for commons management largely turns
on the degree of social value uncertainty" (p 113).
This does not mean that he argues that commercial infra-
structure is not best managed as a commons, that is, by provid-
ing the flow of resources on a nondiscriminatory basis to all
comers. Instead, he argues that there is a strong business case
that will lead firms operating under uncertainty to adopt com-
mons management of their private infrastructure. He suggests
five reasons, some of which are decidedly unpersuasive, while
others offer real insight (pp 95-99). First, he states that con-
sumers dislike discrimination, and therefore firms do not gener-
ally engage in price discrimination (pp 95-96). Second, he ar-
gues that an open, uniform platform may be easier to manage-
essentially, that the private transaction costs associated with
discrimination among consumers outweigh the private benefits
of the infrastructure owners (p 96). These arguments are empir-
ically suspect (that is, we see price discrimination practiced
widely in markets, and the cost is managed usually by tieringilo
as opposed to fine-grained discrimination) and theoretically un-
satisfying. Commons is an institutional arrangement; it is a le-
gal category; it describes a decision by the state to abstain from
throwing its weight behind any single claimant to control the re-
source. A property owner who chooses to offer goods at the same
price to all its customers, but is completely free to do otherwise,
is exercising its exclusive property right; it is not creating a
"commons" unless it formally abjures that right. Certainly, we
see companies releasing their software under free software li-
censes that formally bind them to a "contractually reconstructed"
commons model;"' but treating an at-will decision by a vendor to
110 See Dennis L. Weisman and Robert B. Kulick, Price Discrimination, Two-Sided
Markets, and Net Neutrality Regulation, 13 Tulane J Tech & Intel Prop 81, 86, 94 (2010).
111 See, for example, J.H. Reichman and Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstruct-
ed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property
Environment, 66 L & Contemp Probs 315, 334 n 72 (Winter-Spring 2003) (describing the
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offer standard prices to all consumers as an example of a "com-
mons" threatens to make the category meaningless.
The remaining three reasons Frischmann gives are engag-
ing competitors in cooperative codevelopment, engaging users,
and maintaining flexibility in the face of uncertainty. These rea-
sons certainly do cohere with the experience of network and
high-technology industries. Free and open-source software
(FOSS) licensing, for example, enables interconnection or joint
development of platform technologies like Linux (p 96); similar-
ly, FOSS licensing or adherence to open, nonproprietary stand-
ards facilitates incremental contributions by suppliers and pro-
ductive users in modular industries (pp 96-97). That is, where
downstream innovation increases the total value of the infra-
structure, commons management can encourage that down-
stream effort. Finally, these privately adopted practices main-
tain flexibility in the face of uncertainty (p 98).
Frischmann moves on in the middle of the book to address
what he calls "complications" (pp 115-86). Pricing of nondiscrim-
inatory access in privately owned infrastructure is one problem
that he addresses (pp 117-35), and to a limited extent he also
addresses provisioning problems (pp 159-86). But the primary
move here is an analysis of congestion management, a classic
commons problem (pp 136-58). His answers are drawn from the
well-known set: expanding capacity or building excess capacity;
limiting user-community membership (this is the primary focus,
historically, of the Ostrom school);112 congestion pricing; and use
restrictions, such that uses that are more congestion inducing
may be limited relative to other uses. All these are introduced
against the background of the claim that congestion need not
necessarily be eliminated (p 140). Queuing and clearing are
complements, and we interchange them everywhere, from the
checkout counter at the supermarket to the Internet protocol.
Each solution to avoid or clear congestion has its own limita-
tions and costs in contexts, and the core message of Frisch-
mann's treatment is that, wherever a congestion-management
approach requires discriminatory treatment by user or usage
type, or by congestion pricing, a cost is imposed on uses that is
not always susceptible to expression in willingness to pay or in
political and social power to shape the use restrictions to permit
standard clause in a National Science Foundation grant encouraging free dissemination
of information).
112 See note 26 and accompanying text.
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the operation of the congestion-management approach (pp 155-
58). All the reasons that commons may make sense also suggest
caution with the various methods of congestion management.
The remainder of the book looks at different forms of infra-
structure, from what he calls "traditional" infrastructure, mostly
roads (pp 189-210) and telecommunications (pp 211-24),
through ideas (pp 256-75) and intellectual property (pp 275-
314), all the way to environmental ecosystems (pp 227-52). In
the classic division between splitters and lumpers,1xa Frisch-
mann shows himself here to be a lumper par excellence. This
tends to obscure what is likely the most important contribution
of the book. The ambition to bring all these different types of re-
sources and systems under a single-definition framework of "in-
frastructure" requires Frischmann to treat genuinely nonrival,
classic public goods, like information, knowledge, and culture, as
part of the same framework as clearly congestible goods like
roads, lake shores, or fisheries. His need to treat genuinely pro-
duction- and growth-oriented goods, like telecommunications
networks or highways, with ecological systems, like lakefronts,
in turn pushes him to remain at a level of abstraction that is at
odds with the call for highly nuanced, context-specific analysis
that marks the Ostrom school, and that is so central to Frisch-
mann's other project with Strandburg and Madison to import
the IAD framework into the study of knowledge commons. 14 But
more on that in Part IV. For now, it is important to note that
Frischmann's theoretical ambition is in tension with his efforts
to provide nuanced, context-dependent analysis. He aims to pro-
vide an all-encompassing theory of infrastructure, rather than
commons, and to ground that theory in a demand-side economics
of public, social, and commercial goods. But his institutional and
policy focus remains exclusively on when it makes sense to
adopt commons for infrastructure broadly defined.
The focus on infrastructure in the broadest definition, on
the demand-side failures, and on the commons-management
aspect to the exclusion of provisioning questions hinders the
argument in two ways. First, by including in "infrastructure" re-
sources that do not use open commons as their core organizing
principle, Frischmann's argument necessarily lacks a crisp
113 Gerald Holton, "Lumpers," "Splitters," and Scientific Progress, 8 Academic Ques-
tions 14, 14-15 (Spring 1995).
114 Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg, 95 Cornell L Rev at 678 (cited in note
14).
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delineation and exploration of the role, necessity, and manage-
ment of open commons as a class of institutional interventions.
Second, by focusing on commons management as the core policy
question, and on outlining demand-side failures alone, Frisch-
mann avoids the questions of how to choose among public, mar-
ket, and social provisioning of infrastructure. Writing a book on
infrastructure that would have challenged the 1990s-minted
ideology against public investment and in favor of privatization
wherever possible would be a reasonable choice and would re-
quire different analyses of the supply side, not solely demand-
side factors. Writing a book on commons that challenges the last
several decades' "tragedy of the commons" problems and ex-
pands on the role commons play in enabling growth in complex
modern economies would similarly have been a critical contribu-
tion. I still think that it is the most important contribution of
this book, and that it is indeed an important contribution. But
the ambition to do both dampens the effect.
The difficulty that Frischmann faces because of his empha-
sis on "infrastructure" as opposed to "commons" is clearest in the
chapter on environmental infrastructure (pp 227-52). Here,
Frischmann explains why the environment in general, and par-
ticular elements in it-a lake, river, or forest-are "infrastruc-
ture" as he defines it: a set of resources that are at least partial-
ly shareable and whose primary value is as an input to a diverse
set of productive actions, not all of which are private goods
(pp 227-28). But environmental infrastructures are fundamen-
tally different from the other kinds of infrastructure Frischmann
yokes together in the book: roads and telecommunications net-
works, as well as information, knowledge, culture, and innova-
tion. The environment presents no initial provisioning problems,
but is replete with congestion, pollution, and underinvestment
in renewal. These call forth a diverse set of institutional ap-
proaches, almost none of which are sustainable "open commons."
The air was an open commons before emissions regulation; its
status as open commons was certainly growth promoting, but
with potentially disastrous consequences. Global fisheries were
open commons, with disastrous results for various fish stocks.115
So the environment is the resource set where "commons" are
115 H. Sterling Burnett, Ocean Fisheries: Common Heritage or Tragic Commons? *1
(National Center for Policy Analysis Feb 27, 2007), online at http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs
Iba581.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
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most often observed as "tragic." And, indeed, Frischmann quite
explicitly acknowledges this, arguing that
the dominant approach in the environmental area appears
to be a mixed strategy that regulates some uses and sus-
tains a commons for many others. Environmental infra-
structure resources are often sustained through complex in-
stitutional arrangements that form something akin to semi-
commons property regimes, although often through regula-
tory regimes rather than pure property regimes (p 248).
In other words, the environment is an area replete with regula-
tion or government management; some private rights-certainly
asymmetric entitlements, such as fishing quotas or tradable ex-
traction licenses; many Ostrom-school self-governance arrange-
ments; and relatively little by way of open commons that are
nonetheless managed in a sustainable form. If "the environ-
ment" is infrastructure no less than innovation and highways,
then the "commons" that is useful for infrastructure has to be
circumscribed or defined in looser terms than the open commons
of the highway or the common carriage regime. It need not be a
commons open to an open class of users. And this need to cir-
cumscribe the meaning of "commons" in order to expand the
meaning of "infrastructure" is a loss.
The focus on this broad definition of commons and on de-
mand-side failures of markets for provisioning the class of re-
sources Frischmann calls infrastructure, in turn, allows him to
sidestep the issue of public provisioning. In observing the practi-
cal areas the book covers, we see roads and highways (pp 189-
210), telecommunications systems (pp 211-26), "intellectual in-
frastructure," in which Frischmann includes a broad swath of
the cultural environment (pp 253-316), and environmental re-
sources (pp 227-52). As among these, there is little serious de-
bate in the world today surrounding the public role regarding
investment in roads and highways, although there is with re-
gard to railroads and investment in alternative energy generation
capabilities.116 There is a very live debate over whether the "let
the private sector lead" and extensive deregulation of last-mile
telecommunications distribution was sensible, and a significant
116 See, for example, Paula Berinstein, Alternative Energy: Facts, Statistics, and Is-
sues 110 (Oryx 2001).
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reemerging paradigm of public investment in Internet infra-
structure. 17
Public investment in basic research is another core policy
question, one that has attracted substantial empirical work to
quantify the significance of its beneficial spillover effects and
contribution to growth.1ts Frischmann's focus on demand-side
failures that suggest the high imperfection of classic private
property rights to elicit market investment hints at the need for
public investment; in some cases it hints at the possibility of so-
cial production, but the book is not intended as an answer to the
supply question. If a reader picks up Infrastructure to find out
whether the US government or its municipalities should follow
the Australian and New Zealand model of massive national pub-
lic investment in fiber networks or the Swedish model of munic-
ipal investment in these networks, she will find no answer. Nor
will she find a way of thinking about whether the federal gov-
ernment should launch a Tennessee Valley Authority-style in-
frastructure project constructing offshore wind farms along the
east coast of the United States. For a book that begins by decry-
ing the crumbling state of America's infrastructures (pp ix-x),
quoting a 2009 study that called for $2.2 trillion in public in-
vestments in infrastructure over five years, 119 this is a real
limitation.
Despite these limitations, Infrastructure is an important
contribution to our understanding of the role that commons play
throughout contemporary, complex, dynamically changing econ-
omies. In the remainder of this Review I will try to explore fur-
ther why commons play that role. Like Frischmann, I will avoid
the provisioning question: when provisioning of common infra-
117 For an early insight, see Eli Noam, Public Telecoms 2.0: The Return of the State
Financial Times Tech Hub (Fin Times Apr 25, 2007), online at
http//www.ft.com/cme/s/219be0342c-f253-lldb-a454-000b5dfl0621.html#axzz2Cnm7xCdR
(visited Sept 15, 2013). See also Martin Cave and Ian Martin, Motives and Means for
Public Investment in Nationwide Next Generation Networks, 34 Telecomm Pol 505, 506-
07 (2010); Yochai Benkler, et al, Next Generation Connectivity: A Review of Broadband
Internet Transitions and Policy from around the World *229-39 (report of the Berkman
Center for Internet and Society to the Federal Communications Commission, Feb 2010),
online at http://cyber.law.harvard.edulpubrelease/broadband (visited Sept 15, 2013).
118 For early work, see Zvi Griliches, Productivity, R&D, and Basic Research at the
Firm Level in the 1970's, 76 Am Econ Rev 141, 151-53 (1986). For more recent work, see
Charles I. Jones, Sources of U.S. Economic Growth in a World of Ideas, 92 Am Econ Rev
220, 234 (2002).
119 American Society of Civil Engineers, 2009 Report Card for America's Infrastruc-
ture 6 (citing a study estimating that $2.2 trillion must be invested in the US infrastruc-
ture to bring it up to "good" condition).
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structures should be publicly funded, socially provisioned, or
market-based, and when payment for use, though subject to
symmetric access rules, should be required. Instead, I will try to
crystallize the argument for the importance of open commons to
complex modern economies, and why the basic idea that growth
and development require well-defined property rights sees only
half the institutional toolkit. What we have long known in intel-
lectual property, that innovation and creativity require a mix of
property and robust, substantial commons, 20 is true more gen-
erally for complex modern economies.
III. THE UBIQUITY OF OPEN COMMONS IN MODERN COMPLEX
ECONOMIES
A. What Is a Commons?
In their most recent effort to address the wider range of
commons, Hess and Ostrom defined commons as "a resource
shared by a group of people" that can occur at a wide range of
scales and, critically, raises challenges of use, governance, and
sustainability that can be characterized as social dilemmas.121
This definition starts from the resource and the social dilemma,
rather than the institutional characteristics of the commons. It
is broad and encompassing and reflects the origins of the Ostrom
school in careful study of hundreds of highly detailed, context-
specific, and diverse institutional arrangements for highly di-
verse resources. By contrast, the legal literature on commons
began by looking at the defining institutional characteristic of
commons: symmetric use and access rights to an open class of
users-roads and navigable rivers, the public domain, and so
forth. That institutional emphasis occurred on the background of
negation of a particular, and particularly dominant, institution
in market society: property. In the legal literature and the open-
commons school, the crisp line between commons and property
was the presence of a core institutional characteristic that ne-
gated property: symmetry of privileges. The institutional ar-
rangement tracked a model of information and motivation. The
defining feature of property is that it centralizes the point at
which information and incentives necessary to determine the
120 See Carlisle Ford Runge, Common Property and Collective Action in Economic
Development, 14 World Dev 623, 624 (1986).
121 Hess and Ostrom, Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge Commons at 4-5
(cited in note 3).
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access, use, management, and disposition of a given resource in
a single entity by giving that entity asymmetric power to deter-
mine who will get to access or use the resource, at what time,
and for what purposes. 122 Institutionally, what does the work of
centralizing information and incentives is the location, in a dis-
crete entity, of a call on the state to impose its power to support
that entity's decision. The defining feature of commons is that
there is no such asymmetric power. Instead, the resource is sub-
ject to a set of symmetric rules concerning access, use, extrac-
tion, and management. The absence of asymmetry removes the
focal point for transactions-the owner-as a coordinating
mechanism for competing claims; but the symmetry allows di-
verse users the freedom to operate without transacting, at least
the freedom to operate within the symmetric constraints and
subject to whatever congestion is characteristic of the resource.
Information, as in the case of property, is gathered and pro-
cessed by diverse actors, but unlike the case of property, it is not
then collated in a single decision point; rather, diverse actors act
upon information they have or exchange without the need to
translate it into a universally understood expression (currency,
for example) that compares competing uses and clears them.
Similarly, motivations for action are not directly tied to, or
measured by, the information and decision mechanism. This al-
lows the motivations, like the information, to be divergent and
loosely defined. Open commons with this institutional pattern
are ubiquitous in modern economy and society.
Consider a day in the life of a Wall Street trader. She wakes
up in her private-property apartment (whatever complications
co-ops and condos present are outweighed by the core private-
property nature of the apartment). She gets out of her private-
property bed, and goes into her proprietary bathroom. But then
she turns on the light. The electricity is provided by either a pri-
vate company or a publicly owned utility; whether the company
is privately or publicly owned, public utility law prevents it from
refusing service to our trader unless she pays a higher amount
than do her less wealthy neighbor.123 If she wants to make
toast, the company has no right to prevent her from connecting
any toaster she wishes or to advantage her over her neighbors,
for a fee, as long as the equipment complies with symmetrically
122 Benkler, The Commons as a Neglected Factor at 12 (cited in note 67).
123 See NY Pub Serv Law § 65 (prohibiting price discrimination in the provision of
electricity).
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imposed safety laws and technical standards. Even after elec-
tricity-market deregulation, distribution to homes continues to
include a provider of first and last resort-the utility-whose
terms of service are regulated and symmetrically available to
all. The electric utility cannot offer tiered service to some who
are willing to pay more while throttling back use and creating
brownouts for those not willing to pay more.124 While usage me-
tering certainly introduces a market mechanism of sorts to regu-
late consumption, the critical tell is that even under conditions
of extreme congestion we do not permit rolling brownouts based
on willingness and ability to pay. The utility has the right to re-
fuse service to nonpaying customers. But the rates and use
privileges to connect are not within its property right. That right
is constrained to require the company to offer to all comers
symmetric privileges of access and use subject to set rates and
public standards of connecting equipment to the grid.
Our trader turns on the tap in her sink, and the water that
flows is also a commons. The same applies to the sewage system
she uses as the water leaves the sink. She uses private property
for her toothbrush and soap, her refrigerator, and breakfast.
Then she walks out of her door; if she lives in Tribeca and walks,
she will use the commons that is the sidewalk. If she hops in a
taxi, that private business will use the commons called the
street and be regulated as a common carrier.125 The freedom to
operate of the commons assures that she has not only a yellow
cab, but can also call any one of a wide range of private carriers,
all of whom use the commons to take her from point A to point B
without needing to transact to receive permission from an owner
of the streets. If she lived in Connecticut and drove in, she would
be using 1-95 or any of many highways and parkways, all of
which are commons, despite the theoretically and occasionally
attempted alternatives: private turnpikes, bridges, and ferries.
She might take the subway or commuter rail. Again, each is a
publicly provisioned, commons-managed system.
As she walks into her office building, she relies on its pri-
vate property for a place to work. She then turns on her private-
property computer. Like her refrigerator at home, this computer,
or at least many of its components, was likely imported over an
124 See NY Pub Serv Law § 65 (prohibiting electric companies from granting unrea-
sonable preferences to particular individuals).
125 See NY Gen Mun Law § 181 (authorizing municipal officers and boards to regu-
late the registration and licensing of taxicabs).
1536 The University of Chicago Law Review [80:1499
ocean whose shipping lanes are commons, shipped in a container
whose standard size reduced its cost, and is an international
commons managed by an international standards-setting organ-
ization,126 and was brought through the Panama Canal, which is
required by international treaty to allow all peaceful shipping
without discrimination,127 and denies to the Canal Authority the
rights to exclude or manage passage, or to alienate its powers.12
She might read a proprietary news service, but that news ser-
vice likely relied in part on facts collected elsewhere or data
generated by the government. For example, she might wait for
the next monthly jobs reports; these facts are in the public do-
main and governed as commons, and the newsletter harvests
from the commons and bundles into a private product.
If she uses the Internet, our trader may use a private con-
nection or a connection subject to common-carriage require-
ments. Common carriage, in turn, is a set of legal arrangements
that assures that a private owner that provisions goods subject
to this regime will make them available without discrimination.
In other words, while it is a property regime, it is limited pre-
cisely along the dimension of asymmetric exclusion. It functions
as an open commons, not as a club good, and certainly not as a
private good. This is true everywhere outside the United
States.129 In the United States it was certainly true for Digital
Subscriber Line (DSL) services prior to 2005, and likely true of
126 See generally International Organization for Standardization, Standards, online
at http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards.htm (visited Sept 15, 2013).
127 Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Ca-
nal, 33 UST 11, TIAS No 10029 (1977).
128 See Organic Law of the Panama Canal Authority (Autoridad del Canal de Pana-
m4 1997), online at http://www.pancanal.comleng/legal/law/index.html (visited Sept 15,
2013), translating Ley Orgdnica de I Autoridad de PanamA, online at http*//www.pancanalcom
/esp/legallaw/contents.html (visited Sept 15, 2013). Article 3 bars all rights of alienation
("The Canal constitutes an inalienable patrimony of the Panamanian nation; therefore, it
may not be sold, assigned, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered or transferred."). Article
5 requires nondiscriminatory access:
The fundamental objective of the functions attributable to the Authority is that
the Canal always remain open to the peaceful and uninterrupted transit of
vessels from all nations of the world, without discrimination, in accordance
with the conditions and requirements established in the National Constitution,
international treaties, this Law, and the Regulations. Because of the nature of
the highly essential international public service provided by the Canal, its op-
eration shall not be interrupted for any reason whatsoever.
129 See Benkler, et al, Next Generation Connectivity at *229-39 (cited in note 117)
(describing foreign investments in publicly accessible communications networks).
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cable broadband as well.a0 Since 2005, debates over net neutral-
ity have muddied these waters somewhat on the regulatory
front.a1 But the nature of the service has not changed yet, and
its primary locus now concerns "managed services" as proposed
by primarily the wireless data providers for their particular
form of Internet service.132 If our trader is using a laptop, chanc-
es are it is connected to a WiFi network, and WiFi is an open
commons subject to minimal symmetric-use constraints and a
family of standards shepherded by a professional association.
The Internet itself, riding on top of the wires or wireless, is a
commons, as is the Web. If she accesses any website online, the
probability is roughly 3:1 that the Web server software is an
open-access commons governed by a FOSS license.133 Market
prices she needs to know are in the commons, although her em-
ployer likely pays for privileged early access to the information,
and so for an economically relevant instant they are a proprie-
tary club good and available only to those who buy access. In
this regard membership in the stock exchange historically pro-
vided instantaneous access to market data on a club-good model,
using the legal right to exclude nonmembers from the privately
owned premises of the exchange as a way of excluding them
from the real target-the market prices-which are, as a matter
of law, a commons. And so the day goes on. If she makes trades,
these depend on the legal system, which defines contract and
property rights and promises to enforce them. The legal system
is available to all on nondiscriminatory terms and no person has
180 The status of broadband providers was hotly contested between 2000 and 2005.
The most authoritative court of appeals case suggested that broadband consisted of a
telecommunications service, which was common carriage, and an information service,
which was not. See AT&T Corp v City of Portland, 216 F3d 871, 879 (9th Cir 2000). Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia wrote that any other interpretation was not only wrong, but imper-
missible. National Cable & Telecommunications Association v Brand X Internet Services,
545 US 967, 1005 (2005) (Scalia dissenting). The Federal Communications Commission
nonetheless decided to treat broadband provisioning to the home as an information ser-
vice, not telecommunications service, and the majority of the Supreme Court held that
decision to have been legally permissible, if not obviously correct. Id at 1000-03 (majority).
131 See generally Barbara van Schewick, Internet Architecture and Innovation (MIT
2010).
132 In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, 25
FCCR 17905, 17951-58 (2010).
133 Apache's most recent market share is -62 percent; nginx's is -16 percent; the
license used by Google, at 1.5 percent, is unclear. W3Techs, Usage of Web Servers for
Websites (World Wide Web Technology Surveys May 14, 2013), online at
http://w3techs.com/technologies/overview/webserver/all (visited Sept 15, 2013) (updat-
ing the percentage of websites using various servers on a daily basis).
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the right to exclude anyone else from using it. It is a publicly
provisioned commons.
In personal and commercial life, property is ubiquitous and
highly visible to us. What is less visible is that this property sys-
tem is suspended in commons that undergird and are interpo-
lated throughout the proprietary system elements. Perhaps
there is a libertarian utopia in which all these functions are sub-
ject purely to a proprietary regime. But no country in the world,
whether it professes to be capitalist or socialist, functions purely
on property or purely on commons.
B. Why Are Commons So Common?
1. Microefficiency under uncertainty and change given
imperfect systems of action.
a) Commons and property-based markets. Commons and
property trade off freedom to operate for security in holdings
and power to appropriate. Imagine that John wants to organize
a picnic with his friends. He can rely on a commons or on prop-
erty. Imagine that John has a small backyard in a private home
he owns or rents; he can invite people to his backyard. In this
case, we can say that he invested in buying (or renting) secure
(for a period) access to the capacity to invite up to fifteen people
to an outdoor event at his home. He could also invite them to
meet in the park. In that case, he runs the risk of not finding
exactly the right spot he wants, or of congestion if it is a beauti-
ful sunny day in Sheep Meadow in Central Park. But he gets the
benefit of being able to invite thirty or fifty friends, if that's
what he wants. He does not have the security of property hold-
ings, but he does have a greater freedom of action with regard to
the size of the lawn he can use and therefore the size of the so-
cial network he can engage in this form. Because the park is
large and open for all to use, he can be fairly certain that there
will be enough room, although he may be uncertain as to its pre-
cise quality relative to his yard. If he wants to issue an open in-
vitation for friends of friends to come as well, the probability
that such space will be available in the park, compared to the
certainty of an available, but potentially cramped space in his
backyard, begins to make the freedom to operate (in this case to
expand the amount of space used as needed) of the park more
appealing.
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If he were planning to charge admission, then the loss of
power to appropriate by excluding nonpaying participants would
outweigh the benefits of flexibility. There, he might choose to
expand capacity by renting space from a private party that owns
a larger garden. But here again, he runs the risk of either over-
investing or underinvesting relative to the actual number of at-
tendees, which requires that he limit invitations, require clearer
RSVPs, and so on to avoid overcrowding or unnecessarily expen-
sive overprovisioning. He also runs into transaction costs that
may well make contracting too expensive to justify the transac-
tion to begin with. Once he invests and invites people to a pri-
vate, precleared, secure proprietary location, expanding or con-
tracting capacity through market exchanges, and moving people
to the new space, is likely to be difficult. It is trivial in the park.
Note that in an ideal market, where square feet of yard are per-
fectly fluid and transactions costless, the market would seam-
lessly replicate the freedom to operate that the commons offers,
avoiding the risk of congestion. But the real world is no ideal
market; and in the real world-with units of goods and services
delivered in noncontinuous packages, with transaction and in-
formation costs-the property approach trades off some freedom
to operate for certainty and the power to appropriate, while the
commons offers the inverse values.
In a highly uncertain, changing environment, with needs
and plans that call for continuously updating the required re-
sources, the freedom to operate provided by commons has im-
portant, valuable attributes relative to the security of holdings
and the power to appropriate of property. This tradeoff is far
from hypothetical or limited to parties in the park. When pre-
sented with major spikes in its network after introduction of the
iPhone, AT&T had major congestion problems with its mobile
data network.34 It could have gone to the secondary spectrum
markets set up by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) a few years earlier,135 where it could have leased the
additional capacity in a spot market.136 It did not. Instead, it
134 See Benkler, 26 Harv J L & Tech at 89 (cited in note 32).
135 See id at 101.
136 See Eli Noam, Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday's Heresy, Today's Orthodoxy, To-
morrow's Anachronism. Taking the Next Step to Open Spectrum Access, 41 J L & Econ
765, 779 (1998). Noam's vision of a spot market in spectrum, replacing auctions of stable
long-term property rights, is most closely implemented by Spectrum Bridge. See Spec-
trum Bridge The Secondary Spectrum Market: A Licensing & Leasing Primer *2 (Sept
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combined a long-term proprietary strategy-seeking to purchase
licenses from Qualcomm'37-with a short-term, more dynamic
solution that was based on the commons. AT&T invested in
WiFi hotspots and encouraged users to off-load traffic to their
home and public WiFi spots.138 SFR in France, the second-largest
mobile provider and third-largest home broadband provider,139
went one further and harnessed all of its home broadband sub-
scribers-about 22 percent of the French market14o-to become
WiFi load-balancing points for all their mobile data subscrib-
ers.141 WiFi off-loading by carriers has become the norm, carry-
ing anywhere from 35 percent to 65 percent of mobile data.142
The dramatic rate of increase in required data carrying capacity
meant that carriers found the commons-WiFi-a more flexible
and responsive resource-management strategy for spectrum
than secondary markets, which are the closest thing to straight
property in spectrum that the FCC has ever developed. Note
that carriers do not directly appropriate data carried over WiFi.
They charge mobile users based on usage, but usage over WiFi
connections does not count toward monthly caps and overage
charges. Despite the lack of the power to appropriate data trans-
ferred over WiFi connections, the benefits of flexible deployment
and network growth outweighed a more slow-moving, expensive,
property-based spectrum approach.
The more diverse and uncertain the needs and plans of us-
ers-consumers or producers-are, the more attractive the free-
dom of action associated with having a resource in the commons
is to these users. We can conceptualize it as the commons having
a private option value to private users (distinct from its welfare
effects), whose price is (a) the reduced certainty of availability of
a stated quantity of the resource as is available in markets, it-
self a function of how perfect or imperfect the relevant market
is, and how susceptible to failure; (b) the lost appropriation op-
portunity from not having the resource controlled in a proprie-
tary form; (c) the cost differential between the desired use in the
2008), online at http1/spectrumbridge.con/Libraries/hitePaperfheSecondarySpectrum
_Market_A_LicensinOLeasingPrimer.sflb.ashx (visited Sept 15, 2013).
137 See Benkler, 26 Harv J L & Tech at 101 (cited in note 32).
138 See id at 101-02.
139 See id at 104.
140 Benkler, et al, Next Generation Connectivity at *77 (cited in note 117).
141 Benkler, 26 Harv J L & Tech at 104 (cited in note 32).
142 See id at 103. The scale and scope of use, rather than the precise numbers, are
what is important for purposes of this Review.
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market, given its imperfections (for example, market power over
essential facilities) and the cost of using the commons; and (d)
the risk that the commons will be congested. The greater the
background uncertainty as to the required quantity or quality of
the resource and the market imperfections, the higher the option
value-that is, the more of the benefits of property an agent
would be willing to forgo in exchange for the greater flexibility
offered by commons. The symmetric constraints coupled with a
general privilege to use the resource under these constraints
mean that the need for transactions at the margin is eliminated,
and with it transaction-cost barriers: strategic behavior of plat-
form or essential-facilities owners, imperfect information with
its widespread risk of unmatched offer-ask differences, and so
forth.
Where the level of uncertainty is such that freedom of action
(to adapt to changed circumstances) is an important desidera-
tum-in some cases more so than security in holdings (whose
value and utility are part of the uncertainty) and power to ap-
propriate outputs directly through exclusion (whose coming into
being is part of the uncertainty)-we need, and find ubiquitously
around us, both commons and property. On this argument, with
perfectly frictionless markets under perfect information, we
wouldn't need commons. But this is no more relevant than say-
ing that with perfectly selfless individuals under perfect infor-
mation and frictionless social exchange we wouldn't need prop-
erty. Given imperfect markets, imperfect information, diversely
motivated individuals, and imperfect systems of social coopera-
tion and exchange, some mix of property and commons is neces-
sary for reasonable planning and pursuit of goals. This is from
the private-returns perspective, setting aside collective goals like
efficiency and growth, much less democracy or a richly expres-
sive culture. From an individual agent's perspective, having a
mix of resources-some commons, some property-will increase
his or her utility over time, given imperfect markets, persistent
uncertainty, and change.
b) Imperfect systems all the way down. This basic trade-
off between property and commons is then replicated in the
trade-off between commons and state-administered resource
systems, where the desired action must be translated into a call
on the necessary resources through an administrative process.
Similarly, it is replicated in the trade-off between an open com-
mons and a "social-community-governed" resource that needs to
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deal with making calls on a resource through the socially ac-
ceptable challenge ("Dad, can I borrow the car Friday. . ."). We
act through systems that provide us certain affordances and
constraints that allow us to predict what resources will be avail-
able to us, under what circumstances, and what consequences
are likely to follow from various actions we take. None of these
systems is perfect (including, certainly, social coordination of
commons); we therefore find our societies using a mix of all of
them.
Commons are a partial solution to a decision problem we
face as individuals, all of whose available systems of action are
imperfect. For any given state of the world, we as human beings
have a problem of deciding what to do: which set of resources to
apply to which set of processes, in order to obtain which set of
outcomes, through which system of action. One way to abstract
this decision problem is that we can rely on one or any combina-
tion of four families of systems: two hierarchical systems, gov-
ernment and firms; and two distributed systems, markets and
social interactions. Our actual behaviors and outcomes will be a
function of our actions within these four systems and the com-
bined outcome of those behaviors. Each system incorporates its
own imperfections, its own error term if you will, such that our
behaviors and outcomes reflect a function of these four systems
and their cumulative errors. The error term combines infor-
mation, decision, and execution. Each system has information
failures: in acquisition, formalization, and processing of infor-
mation about the state of the world in which we are considering
action in terms comprehensible within that system. Each has
decision errors in the processes it uses to convert the infor-
mation into a prescription for action within the system. And
each exhibits execution errors in the transformation of the pre-
scription into action, and the action into outcome.
At a broad level of abstraction, hierarchies, both govern-
ments and firms, are better at planning, control, and manage-
ment of relatively known sets of resources, people, processes,
and outcomes. The freedom to operate embodied in commons is
better at exploration, experimentation, rapid deployment, and
adaptation to new information and experimentally observed im-
provements, but weaker at providing security in holdings and
direct appropriation of the benefits of the action through control
over the resources necessary to effect it. Markets, in turn, be-
cause of transaction costs and because of information failures
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associated with formalization of competing options into a price-
cleared comparative framework, fill a middle niche between
firms or governments and commons. They permit more security
and planning for predictable conditions at the expense of some
flexibility and adaptability for unpredictable conditions. This
stylized comparison is, of course, too simple. Experimental gov-
ernmental forms, small entrepreneurial firms, and internal ex-
perimental processes within larger firms seek to retain the ad-
vantages of these hierarchical forms while improving on
experimentation and adaptation; self-governance mechanisms
within commons-based practices, such as free-software develop-
ment or Wikipedia, seek to improve on the management and ap-
propriation limitations without losing flexibility and openness;
and market mechanisms incorporate trust, long-term coopera-
tion, and extensive communication to overcome some of the loss-
inessus associated with converting complex real-world values in-
to discrete prices.
By comparison to open commons in complex modern econo-
mies, limited common property regimes explored by the tradi-
tional Ostrom school cannot offer the same flexibility that open
commons do. Indeed, the first three decades of studies in the
Ostrom school were heavily focused on long-standing, stable ar-
rangements that developed over time to embody highly refined
local knowledge of the conditions of the resource system they
governed144 What makes open-access commons so flexible is that
no one need agree on anything with anyone else about the dispo-
sition of the resource, as long as they comply with a limited
number of symmetrically applied rules (for example, speed limit,
lane shifts, seatbelts; maximum power limits in spectrum; volt-
age and wattage restrictions in power). CPRs provide govern-
ance structures that are not based on the state, but they often
define extraction and use rights quite clearly and provide mech-
anisms for revising the allocations or use rights, sometimes uni-
laterally and sometimes by agreement.145 But their relative ben-
efit is in capturing local knowledge that is, by definition, partly
tacit and hard to abstract for incorporation into a state-
managerial or property-market model, embodying that body of
local knowledge in a stable, sustainable resource utilization
14a Richard Mayr, Undecidable Problems in Unreliable Computations, 297 Theoreti-
cal Computer Sci 337, 337 (2003).
144 See Ostrom, Governing the Commons at 58-102 (cited in note 13).
145 See id at 79-81.
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system, and embedding it in a motivational matrix rich in social
motivations, as well as material self-interest. While these sys-
tems generally include conflict-resolution systems and mecha-
nisms for reorienting the resource and revising the respective
rights, these are not systematically more flexible than just
straight property or administrative fiat.
Recognizing this difference between open commons on the
one hand, and property, administrative management (whether
state based or firm based), and CPRs on the other, focuses the
value of commons in the characteristics of information and
knowledge. The world is complex, messy, and uncertain. It re-
sists abstraction. That is why tacit knowledge is so critical and
so sticky. "We know more than we can tell"146 because even our
own mental processes require abstraction if we are to communi-
cate them in terms others can understand. In order to reallocate
a resource from one exclusive use to another, it is necessary to
translate the comparative uses into some commensurable ab-
straction: a price, a value cognizable in the administrative sys-
tem, or a claim on a common pool or social resource stated in
terms cognizable by the social system. Open commons avoid that
necessity to abstract and translate because uses are not exclu-
sive. It is sufficient for an individual to decide to act, within the
constraints of the symmetric access and use rules, without fully
expressing the value expected from the contemplated action. The
more these rules confine the uses, the less valuable the com-
mons for this purpose. The more abstract, minimally constrain-
ing, and general these constraints are, the more valuable the
freedom to operate can be. That is why commons with highly ab-
stract and general rules-such as TCP/IP for the Internet, sim-
ple power limits for WiFi, compatibility standards for electricity,
or speed limits and safety requirements for roads without sub-
stantial emphasis on particular uses-implementations, or dedi-
cated channels have proved so productive.
2. Macroeffects of open commons.
From Rose's Comedy of the Commons to Frischmann's Infra-
structure, and through the literature on the public domain, a
central claim on behalf of commons is their contribution to positive
spillovers in activities that have demand-side increasing returns to
scale and scope. As Rose argued, roads and navigable-waters
146 See Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension 4 (Chicago 1966).
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doctrines developed to support open commons as trade began to
expand, and in turn the open access to these arteries of trade fed
back into increasing levels of trade that used these arteries as
transportation inputs.147 Autarky does not need open roads; free
trade does. So too with the very act of trading, or access to ports.
The abandonment of exclusive monopolies on trade with certain
colonies, or in certain commodities, was a shift in the institu-
tional design of trade to an open commons (in the sense a shift
from asymmetric power to control a resource, an exclusive mo-
nopoly conveyed as a royal favor or auctioned to the highest bid-
der, to an institutional system in which anyone could buy and
sell traded commodities under symmetrically imposed port tar-
iffs, for example). These physical commons share this character-
istic with intangible commons, like open standards. If shipping
container standards were proprietary, in the sense that there
was an owner of the standard with whom one would have to ne-
gotiate in order to use a standard-size container to ship goods
around the world, from ship to tractor trailer or train, we would
have the transaction costs, strategic behavior, and drag on trade
that we see today debated in the question of patents on stand-
ards.148 Innovation obviously does not grind to a halt, but the
drag is well studied149 The centrality of robust open commons to
growth became clearer as we came to see data and information,
innovation, and knowledge as ever more central to growth and
development, and innovation and growth, in turn, as the core
contributor to welfare over time.
Frischmann's Infrastructure locates these spillovers at the
heart of his case for infrastructure in general and commons
management approaches in particular (p 94). Moreover, an im-
portant contribution of his particular analysis is to identify that
most infrastructures we care about involve mixed downstream
uses: commercial, public, and social. As a result, the positive ex-
ternalities and spillovers are larger and less tractable, in the
sense that they cannot effectively be internalized in the classic
economic sense without altering or ignoring the social- and pub-
lic-goods aspects of the infrastructure (pp 108-14).
147 See Rose, 53 U Chi L Rev at 767-70 (cited in note 4).
148 See Pamela Samuelson, Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?,-93
Minn L Rev 1943, 1965-69 (2009).
149 See id at 1969-2003.
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3. Commons, uncertainty, and an open society.
If all systems we inhabit-governments and firms, markets
and social relations-are imperfect, if all incorporate error as
systems of action, and uncertainty is high, commons offer a
feedback and correction mechanism for political action as well as
for material and intellectual production. In the face of persistent
uncertainty, freedom of action in the commons provides room for
experimentation not only in productive, material, and intellec-
tual innovation, but in social relations and political action.
The role of commons in political action is most directly visi-
ble. To the extent that action through and on political systems
requires access to resources-to frame the state of the world and
options for collective action, to communicate these views and op-
tions, to mobilize for influence over the institutions of the
state--open-access commons in a resource base sufficient to par-
ticipate in that public process expands the range of potential
participants. In particular, it allows views to emerge that are in-
sufficiently widespread to garner attention in mass-media mar-
kets, and people who are dispersed to collectively mobilize. The
debate over Internet and democracy is the current locus of this
debate, and I will not rehearse it here.50
But the necessary imperfection of all systems-hierarchical
(both governments and firms) and distributed (both price based
and social)-means that extant systems will always constrain
action and implement erroneous choices. Given persistent uncer-
tainty, exploration, experimentation, and adaptation are a nec-
essary source of collective learning and common intelligence for
these inherently fallible systems. We have long thought that
more or less free markets enable freedom to operate, and are
therefore an important corrective to imperfect government deci-
sion and conservative or repressive social practices and norms.s
But more or less free and open commons are similarly an
150 For competing views, see Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social
Production Transforms Markets and Freedom 176-80, 212-15 (Yale 2006) (arguing that
the public sphere created by the Internet democratizes to a greater extent than does tra-
ditional mass media); Matthew Hindman, The Myth of Digital Democracy 11-12 (Prince-
ton 2009) (asserting that the purported democratizing effect of the Internet is overstat-
ed); Cass R. Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0 5-12 (Princeton 2007) (warning against the
dangers of consumers' increased abilities to "filter" what they are exposed to as a result
of emerging technologies).
151 See Viktor V. Vanberg, Markets and Regulation: On the Contrast between Free-
Market Liberalism and Constitutional Liberalism, 10 Const Political Economy 219, 221-
23 (1999).
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important corrective, both to persistently imperfect markets and
to the errors of more or less well-functioning markets that, by
their nature, drive action toward those behaviors and outcomes
that can be translated into exchangeable market value.152 A core
common infrastructure, a set of core resources necessary for ac-
tion that are available to all for action and are not themselves
market cleared, offer a freedom of action that is orthogonal to
the freedom of action that a well-functioning market offers. Each
has different affordanceses and constraints. Each permits differ-
ent kinds of exploration and experimentation. And therefore
each is part of the value of an open society as a learning system
in the face of persistent uncertainty and constant change.
IV. OPEN COMMONS, THE OSTROM SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS OF PERSISTENTLY IMPERFECT, LOOSELY COUPLED
SYSTEMS
The critical insight of Ostrom's LAD framework was that
human action occurs in discrete arenas with diverse and histori-
cally contingent characteristics and actors, whose own interac-
tions were diverse, contingent, and recursive with the physical
environment and social practices.154 Understanding success and
failure of these systems required a structured analysis that took
local contingencies into account and was capacious enough to ac-
commodate many and diverse institutional solutions to matters
of provisioning, allocation, use, and sustainability. This ap-
proach then provides an alternative to efforts to generalize
across systems and to standardize responses to problems of pro-
duction in terms of either property and well-functioning mar-
kets, or state and well-managed administration. For this diver-
sity to persist, one must assume that different subsystems,
while possibly interconnected-as through markets or jurisdic-
tions-retain sufficient internal coherence and independence
from each other that their particular arrangement of resources,
152 For a particularly compelling and new analysis of one class of such errors, see
generally Amy Kapczynski and Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the
Limits of Patents, 122 Yale L J 1900 (explaining how diverse limits on excludability sys-
tematically bias investment in innovation toward more excludable innovations as a dis-
tinct failure, over and above errors associated with nonrivalry, of patent systems).
153 See Yochai Benkler, Networks of Power, Degrees of Freedom, 5 Intl J Comm 721,
724 (2011).
154 For a recent synthesis and overview of the theory, see Elinor Ostrom and Char-
lotte Hess, A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons, in Charlotte Hess and
Elinor Ostrom, eds, Understanding Knowledge as a Commons 41, 42-43 (cited in note 3).
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practices, institutions, and agents is the operative determinant
of behaviors and outcomes in that subsystem.55 It suggests a re-
jection of only the first half of the Anna Karenina principle:
while indeed "every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way,"
it is not at all the case that "[h]appy families are all alike."156
When considering the ubiquity of commons in complex mod-
ern economies, the critical observation is that provisioning and
governance do not always go hand in hand, and the particular
form of decoupling is achieved differently for different shared re-
sources. Sometimes, provisioning and governance are combined.
Highways and municipally owned public utilities are examples
of commons that are provisioned by government organs and in-
stitutionally governed by government organs, with rules that
leave significant freedom to operate and are then further coordi-
nated locally and dynamically through social norms and simple
coordination. Dams in the zanjeras that Ostrom described are
provisioned socially and locally and governed by social norms
and practices of the same community.157 And so on. But provi-
sioning and governance are not necessarily linked. WiFi devices
are provisioned by private markets in devices, subject to govern-
ance that is a composite of background rules set by the FCC
(government) and standards set by the Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), a professional association
that is neither a market organization nor the state. Publicly
funded research is often publicly provisioned (in the funding as-
pect) but socially governed by a peer-review process relating to
both funding decisions and publication, such that the funding
agency does not get to decide what research specifically to fund
or publish. 168 Table 1 sketches the various possible combinations,
and fills in those we observe, while marking those that neces-
sarily have a null value. The critical point here is the organiza-
tional and institutional diversity for the diverse contexts in
which resources are managed as commons. The synthesis be-
tween the Ostrom school and the open-commons school emerges
155 This is very much the assumption underlying much of the work in systems theo-
ry. See Niklas Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society 213-17 (Columbia 1982) (Ste-
phen Holmes and Charles Larmore, trans).
156 Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina 3 (Random House 1939) (Constance Garnett, trans).
157 See Ostrom, Governing the Commons at 82-88 (cited in note 13) (discussing the
zanjera irrigation communities of the Philippines as an enduring limited community
property regime).
158 See Barry Bozeman and Monica Gaughan, Impacts of Grants and Contracts on
Academic Researchers'Interactions with Industry, 36 Rsrch Pol 694, 704 (2007).
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most clearly when we acknowledge that context sensitivity, un-
derstanding the resource set and the user set, and how these re-
late to the particular problems of provisioning and sustainability
is precisely the core insight of the IAD approach that the Ostrom
school developed and adopted. The trick, or difficulty, in trans-
posing that framework to open commons is that we need to
begin to see how subsets of users or actors who do not make up
the whole of the user community begin to take over governance
roles, and how these, in turn, manage their relationship with
the open class of users.
TABLE 1. COMMONS-BASED/OPEN CLASS SYMMETRIC ACCESS
AND USE AND PROPERTY-BASED/EXCLUSION GOVERNANCE
MODELS ORGANIZED BY MODE OF PROVISIONING
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The table is based on a more or less standard set of four ma-
jor provisioning systems-government, market, social, and natu-
ral-and four major governance approaches: state, property and
contract, social norms, and no constraint. Each cell is divided in-
to two: a light-gray shaded subcell where access to the resource
is available to an open class on nondiscriminatory terms and ex-
clusion is eschewed, and a black-shaded subcell where asymmet-
ric exclusion is the organizing principle. The traditional two an-
tipodes (market, state) are represented by the categories of
market-provisioned, property- and contract-governed, asymmet-
ric exclusivity subcell (hot dogs, homes, and so on), and the
state-provisioned, state-regulated, asymmetric exclusivity sub-
cell (military bases, food stamps). Classic public goods are repre-
sented in the state-provisioning, no constraint cell (lighthouses).
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The dominant modes of commons that serve as the foundation of
commercial, industrial economies fall in the state- and market-
provisioning cells, in the nonexclusivity subcells, whether sub-
ject to state regulation (highways, public utilities, mass transit
for state-provisioned, and common carriers, privately held utili-
ties, or unlicensed wireless bands), or no constraint (open gov-
ernment data, or formerly IP protected materials now in the
public domain). The more exotic phenomena that have developed
in networked society-free software, both commercial and purely
socially produced--occupy the subcells of social provisioning,
mostly with no asymmetric exclusivity, while many of the CPRs
occupy both the symmetric nonexclusivity (for uses within the
CPR) and asymmetric exclusivity (for the relations between in-
siders and outsiders in CPRs) subcells of social norms-organized,
socially produced goods.
What I try to capture in this table is the range and diversity
of combinations of practices and institutions surrounding provi-
sioning and governance of the core goods and services in complex
modern economies. A longer term project would require an as-
sessment of the relative contributions of each of these classes of
outputs to human welfare over time, one that would include the
relative contribution of innovation, and within it, of commons-
based as opposed to proprietary-exclusive strategies to the rate
and direction of innovation. Early efforts by Eric von Hippel and
others, for example, just to measure the relative contribution of
user innovation, and work comparing the value of WiFi to cellu-
lar wireless systems,59 suggest that the contribution of com-
mons-based approaches is substantial.160 For now all that I am
seeking to establish is the plausibility of the richness of ap-
proaches, and the fact that the old binary, state-versus-market
description of the universe of productive resource-governance
options profoundly understates the range of available institu-
tional options open to large, complex market economies. There is
159 See Benkler, 26 Hary J L & Tech at 97-98, 101-24 (cited in note 32).
160 For an overview of von Hippel and colleagues' work on the measurement of user
innovation, see Eric von Hippel, Jeroen P.J. de Jong, and Stephen Flowers, Comparing
Business and Household Sector Innovation in Consumer Products. Findings from a Rep-
resentative Study in the UK (working paper, Sept 27, 2010), online at
http://papers.ssrn.comlsol8/papers.cfm?abstractjd=1683503 (visited Sept 15, 2013);
Jeroen P.J. de Jong and Eric von Hippel, Measuring User Innovation in Dutch High Tech
SMEs: Frequency, Nature and Transfer to Producers, *5- (MIT Sloan Research Paper
No 4724-09, Feb 27, 2009), online at http://papers.sern.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=1352496 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
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a wide and diverse set of practices that avoid the dilemma of
choosing between the two sometimes equally problematic op-
tions: state and market.
The effect of this diversity of choices might be more easily
understood by considering a classic debate over property and
commons in public goods: the debate between Kenneth Arrow
and Harold Demsetz over patents. Arrow had famously defended
government funding of science on the observation that, because
of nonrivalry and the "shoulders of giants"161 effect, using prop-
erty to stimulate innovation leads to systematic underutilization
of the innovations, loss of welfare, and follow-on innovation.162
Demsetz countered that, while there were efficiency losses, the
error rate of a government funding agency as to where to focus
research and funding was sufficiently higher than the error rate
of a market-driven patent system-that it was better to incur
the welfare losses Arrow had identified in exchange for the
higher quality signal that the institutional arrangement of pa-
tents would offer firms in directing their research.163 What is
missing from Demsetz's response is the recognition that (a) most
large-scale innovation investment occurs in firms, and firms are
still managerial planning agencies; private planning is still
planning, and gets in the way of follow-on research that could
use the innovation's outputs in new directions; and (b) govern-
ment funding does not necessarily involve government govern-
ance of the direction of research. As to the first point, patents
limit the freedom of action of various follow-on innovators; while
some can transact, not all can-the cost may be too high, or the
application too far afield from what the owner sees as beneficial.
In all these, limitations on patents that result in a broader free-
dom to operate in an open commons will result in more diverse
experimentation and innovation. Similarly, science funding de-
veloped not as a government command-and-control system, but
as a hybrid system that combines public provisioning (for exam-
ple, the NIH budget),164 with some high-level policy making, with
161 Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research
and the Patent Law, 5 J Econ Persp 29, 29 (Winter 1991).
162 See Arrow, Economic Welfare at 623-25 (cited in note 47).
163 See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J L &
Econ 1, 10-13 (1969).
164 National Institutes of Health, Overall Appropriations (Department of Health and
Human Services 2013), online at http-1/oficeofbudget.od.nih.gov/pdfa/FY13/Vol%201%2OTab
%202%20-%200verall%2OAppropriations.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
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a complex system of peer review of the allocation of these fund-
ing flows.
A similar trend toward mixing and matching governance
structures, provisioning mechanisms, and open-access commons
is visible throughout the networked economy. About 40 percent
of software companies reported, as of 2010, developing at least
some free or open-source software.165 This follows a decade since
IBM first announced its major strategic decision to contribute to
open-source software.66 Google's Android is open source.167 What
are these companies doing? Even where the basic provisioning is
funded by the firm, it is placed in a governance structure that
allows anyone to take, modify, and redistribute the code. Both
Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD)-type FOSS licensing and
the copyleft provisions of the GNU General Public License (GPL)
create an open-access commons as far as use, distribution, copy-
ing, and modification of the software. Some of the provisioning is
firm funded; some is peer production that is not funded at all or
is not directly funded by a firm168 All the desiderata of wide-
spread participation, testing, and development are based on the
open-access characteristic of the licensing. But extensive aca-
demic work has shown that peer communities do graft diverse
governance structures on such open systems: Chris Kelty's work
on the Linux kernel and Apache;169 the detailed analyses of the
Debian community by Gabriella Colemanl7o and by Siobhn
OMahony and Fabrizio Ferraro;171 and extensive work on Wikipedia
165 See Josh Lerner and Mark Schankerman, The Comingled Code: Open Source and
Economic Development 67 (MIT 2010).
166 See IBM Pledges 500 U.S. Patents to Open Source in Support of Innovation and
Open Standards, IBM News Room (IBM Jan 11, 2005), online at http://www-03.ibm.com
/press/us/en/pressrelease/7473.wss (visited Sept 15, 2013). For an analysis of IBM's open.
source patent pledge, see Benkler, Wealth of Networks at 46-47 (cited in note 150).
187 See http://source.android.com (visited Sept 15, 2013).
188 See Andrea Bonaccorsi and Cristina Rossi, Comparing Motivations of Individual
Programmers and Firms to Take Part in the Open Source Movement: From Community to
Business, 18 Knowledge Tech & Pol 40, 42-51 (Winter 2006) (reporting on the incentives
that drive firms to engage in open-source projects and comparing them to the motiva-
tions of individual participants). See generally Sam Williams, Free as in Freedom: Rich-
ard Stallman's Crusade for Free Software (O'Reilly 2002).
169 See Christopher M. Kelty, Two Bits: The Cultural Significance of Free Software
212 (Duke 2008).
170 See generally E. Gabriella Coleman, Three Ethical Moments in Debian (working
paper, Sept 15, 2005), online at http://ssrn.comlabstract=805287 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
171 See SiobhAin O'Mahony and Fabrizio Ferraro, The Emergence of Governance in
an Open Source Community, 50 Acad Mgmt J 1079, 1088-92 (2007).
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governance, most comprehensively by Joseph Reagle172 These
studies describe governance structures grafted over these sys-
tems: usually meritocratic-mostly "do-ocracy" (government by
those who show up and do the work); heavily consensus oriented
(but requiring only rough consensus rather than creating a veto-
rich environment of absolute consensus, and only among those
who do the work and show up); a substantial degree of irrever-
ence; redundant pathways so as to avoid conclusive decision
making; rare use of formal processes; never of law or managerial
fiat. We see similar structures for the governance of the basic
Internet infrastructure itself.
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the World
Wide Web Consortium (W3C) are very different institutions that
govern the core standards on which the Internet and World
Wide Web, respectively, run. The IETF is still entirely anar-
chic-anyone can join by showing up, and the decision-making
process is rough consensus, debate, and largely through consent
and acquiescence.173 The W3C has a more complex membership
structure, with the strong charismatic leadership of Tim Berners
Lee, but working groups that, as in the IETF, are open to all and
which are fundamentally meritocratic.'7n Both TCP/IP and
HTML (the core standards), however, are open commons-they
are designed technically, and managed institutionally and or-
ganizationally, to be usable by anyone and to empower no one to
exclude anyone from using them. They are open commons at the
very heart of our communications system.
The details of each of these in particular matter less than
the overall point. Open commons where "anything goes" may or
may not be "tragic," depending on the characteristics of the re-
source set to which they apply. The public domain in infor-
mation, knowledge,. and culture that is "old" (by whatever defini-
tion one chooses) is purely open access, with no rules except of
the accession of particular bits into the public domain. Many
open commons do incorporate some form of governance to deal
with provisioning, either initial or renewal, or congestion. There
172 See Joseph Michael Reagle Jr, Good Faith Collaboration: The Culture of Wikipe-
dia 117 (MIT 2010).
173 See Internet Engineering Task Force, Getting Started in the IETF (Internet Soci-
ety), online at http://www.ietf.org/newcomers.html (visited Sept 15, 2013) (describing the
structure and procedures of the IETF as "completely open to newcomers ... no formal
membership, no membership fee, and nothing to sign").
174 Participation FAQ (World Wide Web Consortium), online at
http://www.w3.org/participatelfaq.html (visited Sept 15, 2013).
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is no single answer for how best to provision or renew a re-
source, or how to manage congestion, without losing the freedom
to operate created by the commons. It is here that the context-
and detail-intensive approach that Ostrom championed,175 and
that Frischmann together with Michael Madison and Katherine
Strandburg have advocated with regard to knowledge and cul-
tural commons,176 allows us to synthesize the two schools. De-
tailed studies of peer production practices, open commons
online, and various other -human practices that treat their in-
puts and outputs as open commons but nonetheless require and
instantiate governance structures are a critical part of our ca-
pacity to accept the sustainability and significance of commons,
as well as how we go about designing new commons as new re-
sources, or new failures of the property, firm, or state models
come to light.
That the two schools of commons studies can be synthesized
and made to complement each other does not, however, collapse
them into each other. The Ostrom school is concerned with collec-
tive action with regard to resources where there are potential so-
cial dilemmas involved in the utilization of these resources. 177 The
open-commons school emphasizes the comparative institutional
advantages of commons over property where the benefits of the
marginal increase in freedom to operate offered by commons rela-
tive to property is greater than the cost in terms of (a) reduced
ability to appropriate through exclusion and (b) congestion, if any.
The Ostrom school offers an admonition to make that cost-benefit
analysis in terms that are resource- and context-specific, and of-
fers a framework to evaluate the institutional structures aimed at
governing these open commons, in particular when the error as-
sociated with government- or firm-based governance is greater
than the error involved in social organization and self-
governance. Both are necessary if we are to develop a more com-
prehensive and realistic model of the institutional diversity nec-
essary to allow complex modern economies and societies to learn,
adapt, and develop in an increasingly complex and uncertain
world, relying as they all must on irreducibly fallible systems.
175 See Ostrom, Governing the Commons at 192-216 (cited in note 13) (offering a
framework for analysis of commons).
176 Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg, 95 Cornell L Rev at 708 (cited in note
14).
177 See Hess and Ostrom, Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge Commons at 5
(cited in note 3).
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